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 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This report is concerned with the radioactive 
waste management and decommissioning 
implications of the construction of new 
reactors in the UK. 
 
Radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel is 
currently stored in the short and medium 
term (of the order decades) in interim 
storage facilities. These stores are regulated 
by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 
and the Environment Agency (EA -England 
and Wales) or Scottish Environmental 
Protection Agency (SEPA)-Scotland). Most 
low-level waste (LLW) is currently disposed 
of in the national low level waste disposal 
facility at Drigg, in Cumbria which has been 
in operation since 1959. Some LLW is stored, 
as it does not meet the facility acceptance 
criteria. However, the UK currently has no 
long-term policy for the management of 
intermediate and high level and 
intermediate level radioactive wastes (HLW, 
ILW) and this is the subject of the ongoing 
Managing Radioactive Waste Safely (MRWS) 
programme being run under the aegis of 
Defra and the Devolved Administrations. 
 
Any decision to build new nuclear power 
stations will be controversial. The inability to 
demonstrate and implement an adequate 
long-term waste management policy has 
been seen by many as the “Achilles heel” of 
the nuclear industry. The debate on new 
nuclear build has often been centred around 
issues of waste management; this is 
expected to continue. For example, is it right 
to produce the additional wastes, which a 
new build programme would create, when 
no current long-term management solution 
exists for the wastes already in existence? 
The costs and timing of decommissioning 
nuclear power stations have also been the 
subjects of arguments for and against new 
build. However, irrespective of a new build 
programme, the current waste legacy exists 
and has to be dealt with.  
Section 2 of the report provides a summary 
of the development of radioactive waste 
management policy and its implementation 
over the years. In particular it traces, the 
history in terms of Government policy 
announcements on long-term management 
against the efforts to attempt to site 
disposal facilities, culminating in the 1997 
failure of the deep repository siting 
programme. 
 
This led to a number of initiatives post-1997 
to address the issue which eventually led to 
Defra and the Devolved Administrations’ 
Managing Radioactive Waste Safely 
programme, designed to allow the UK to 
address its long-term radioactive waste 
management legacy. The current phase of 
this process is being overseen by the 
Committee on Radioactive Waste 
Management (CoRWM) who are to make 
recommendations on long-term 
management options in July 2006. 
 
Lessons learned from past siting failures play 
a part in future progress, and Section 2 
indicates the legal and social contextual 
changes that have taken place which may 
allow decisions on progress to be seen as 
legitimate. Defra and the Devolved 
Administrations are also currently 
undertaking a consultation programme 
looking at the Future Policy for the 
Management of Low Level Radioactive 
Waste in the UK, which has been established 
in recognition of the fact that the future LLW 
arising is expected to exceed the existing 
capacity of the Drigg disposal facility. The 
Government’s current decommissioning 
policy is also summarised in this section and 
this exemplifies increased stakeholder 
involvement in industry decisions. 
 
Section 3 considers in more detail current 
waste management practice, covering 
aspects of the radioactive waste inventory 
as well as the impact of declaring as waste 
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 some radioactive materials not yet classified 
as waste, and other scenarios. Despite a lack 
of Government policy on the long-term 
management of wastes, they still have to be 
dealt with, and Section 3 describes the 
arrangements for packaging wastes. 
Decommissioning is also discussed here, 
including cost aspects. The role of spent fuel 
reprocessing is also described. 
Decommissioning and waste management 
costs and funding are also discussed. 
 
Summaries of overseas’ decommissioning 
and radioactive waste management 
programmes are provided in section 4. This 
covers both near-surface and deep 
repository projects, examples of 
decommissioning and a summary of 
financing arrangements. The section 
contains two case studies: one for the 
decommissioning of the Spanish Vandellós I 
reactor and one for the whole Finnish 
programme.  
 
Section 5 considers new build in the UK and 
the implications for various aspects of waste 
management and decommissioning 
including the MRWS programme, inventory 
and operational waste management 
implications, burning plutonium in new 
reactors, decommissioning, and costs and 
financing.
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 2 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 
 
This section provides a summary of the 
development and implementation history of 
radioactive waste management policy in the 
UK. In this respect it considers two principal 
periods: pre 1997 and post 1997. 
 
In March of that year the Secretary of State 
for the Environment refused to give Nirex 
the go-ahead to construct an underground 
research facility at its preferred repository 
location of Sellafield – a decision which the 
House of Lords select Committee on Science 
and Technology said “stopped dead in its 
tracks” the UK programme for the deep 
disposal of radioactive waste [1]. 
 
This section also considers current 
decommissioning policy and the future 
implementation of policy following any 
change in policy. 
 
2.1 Pre 1997 
The first major Government review of 
radioactive waste management in the UK 
was carried out in the late 1950s but the 
next review did not take place until the 
1970s when the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution issued the "Flowers 
Report" [2]. 
 
As a result [3], the Government made the 
Department of the Environment responsible 
for radioactive waste management policy, 
increased HLW disposal research, but 
recognised the need for a national ILW 
disposal facility. A further consequence was 
the establishment of Radioactive Waste 
Management Advisory Committee (RWMAC) 
to provide independent advice to 
Government. 
 
As part of the HLW programme, the drilling 
of boreholes began at Altnabreac, Scotland 
in 1979 and later at Harwell in Oxfordshire 
but was discontinued in 1981 as a result of 
public opposition. 
 
A 1982 policy White Paper [4] acknowledged 
that the lack of ILW disposal facilities was a 
“major gap” and indicated the need to have 
one “by the end of the decade”. The paper 
also announced the setting up of the Nuclear 
Industry Radioactive Waste Executive (i.e. 
NIREX) by the nuclear industry. NIREX, which 
was incorporated as United Kingdom Nirex 
Limited (Nirex) in 1985, had the remit to 
develop new land based facilities for LLW 
and ILW and run the annual sea dumping 
operation. No organisation had the 
responsibility to look at HLW (or spent 
nuclear fuel) disposal and the Government 
stated in the White Paper that HLW would be 
stored for about 50 years. 
 
Sea disposal was halted in 1983 as a result 
of the meeting of international London 
Dumping Convention. The Government later 
announced it would keep open the option 
for disposal of large items of waste from 
decommissioning of nuclear plant, before 
eventually accepting a full ban. 
 
In 1983, Nirex announced its choice of 
Elstow for a near-surface facility for LLW and 
short-lived ILW, and Billingham for a deep 
facility for long-lived ILW. Following much 
local opposition at Billingham, in January 
1985 the Secretary of State for the 
Environment invited the Executive not to 
proceed further at Billingham and asked it to 
select further sites for investigation for 
shallow disposal [5]. In 1986 Nirex 
announced its choice of four sites: 
Killingholme, Fulbeck, Bradwell and Elstow. 
 
In 1986 the House of Commons Select 
Committee on the Environment published 
"The Rossi Report" [6]. It concluded that the 
UK lagged behind other nations on 
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 geological disposal and recommended that 
near-surface disposal facilities would only be 
publicly acceptable for short-lived LLW. The 
Government accepted the recommendation 
[7] but noted there were no technical 
reasons behind this . They further reaffirmed 
the policy of storing HLW for 50 years and 
the commitment to develop a deep facility 
for long-lived ILW, saying that Nirex would 
identify potential sites. 
 
In early 1987 Nirex and the Secretary of 
State for the Environment agreed that work 
on the four shallow sites be taken no further 
as there was not much cost difference 
between disposing of LLW with ILW in a 
deep repository and the cost of disposing of 
it in a new shallow repository. The Secretary 
of State announced in May 1987 that Nirex 
would concentrate on identifying a "suitable 
location for a deep multi-purpose facility" for 
both ILW and LLW marking the start of the 
deep repository site selection programme 
[8]. Nirex carried out this process in just less 
than two years eventually leading to the 
shortlisting of 12 sites. Nirex announced in 
1989 its intention to investigate first 
Sellafield and Dounreay, an approach that 
was endorsed by the Government following 
consultation with RWMAC. 
 
In the1990 White Paper, This Common 
Inheritance [9], the Government confirmed 
the choice of disposal in a deep repository as 
the long-term management option for ILW. 
 
In 1991, Nirex announced that it proposed to 
concentrate its investigations on Sellafield 
because of the advantages it offered in 
terms of waste transport, with the majority 
of ILW for disposal arising from BNFL's 
operations at Sellafield. 
 
In 1992 Nirex stated its intention to construct 
a Rock Characterisation Facility (RCF) (known 
in some countries as an underground rock 
laboratory or URL), submitting a planning 
application in July 1994. The application was 
refused by Cumbria County Council in 
December 1994, a decision which triggered 
the Public Inquiry into the RCF, held between 
September 1995 and February 1996. 
 
Also in 1992 the Department of Environment 
published a policy statement [10] saying that 
“early disposal in a deep facility is the right 
answer” and “on-site storage is an 
unacceptable long-term option … because 
decisions on disposal should not be left to 
future generations…”. 
 
A Government review of radioactive waste 
management policy was carried out in 
parallel with the 1994 commercial and 
economic review of nuclear power. The 
conclusions of this review were published in 
1995 as Cm 2919 [11]. 
 
In summary, they were that the policy for 
radioactive waste management should be 
based on the same basic principles as apply 
to environment policy and sustainable 
development. Further, that radioactive 
wastes should not be unnecessarily created 
and are “disposed of at appropriate times 
and in appropriate ways so as to safeguard 
the interests of existing and future 
generations”. The conclusions also 
reaffirmed the policy of ILW disposal rather 
than indefinite storage. 
 
Other relevant conclusions of the Review 
were that reprocessing should be a 
commercial judgment of the owner of the 
fuel; HLW and spent fuel (if not reprocessed) 
should be decay stored for 50 years prior to 
deep disposal and it would develop an HLW  
research strategy for this. 
 
On Partitioning and Transmutation it would 
keep just a watching brief. Further, 
decommissioning of nuclear power stations 
should be undertaken as soon as reasonably 
practicable and that segregated funds should 
be established by the privatised nuclear 
industry, whilst it would examine the 
provisioning policies of the unprivatised 
industry. 
 
2.2 Post 1997 
In November 1996, the RCF Public Inquiry 
Inspector issued his recommendation on 
Nirex’s appeal to the Secretary of State for 
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 the Environment. In March 1997 the 
Secretary of State announced that he 
supported the Inspector’s recommendation 
[12] that the appeal be dismissed. 
 
The Inspector’s grounds for recommending 
dismissal of the appeal concerned 
straightforward planning matters, which 
might apply to any type of development; 
and reasons particular to the RCF and to the 
repository which might have followed it. The 
planning matters included the adverse 
environmental impact of the development. 
He also stated that the proposal to build the 
RCF was premature as more needed to be 
known about the hydrogeology and geology 
of the site and the underground impact of 
constructing the RCF. The Inspector also 
concluded that the site had not been 
selected in an objective and methodical 
manner. 
 
Active public debate on issues surrounding 
the decision took place in the aftermath of 
the 1997 announcement. Perhaps the most 
significant initial step was the House of 
Lords’ Select Committee Enquiry [1]. They 
said the decision “stopped dead in its tracks” 
the UK programme for the deep disposal of 
radioactive waste. Their report made some 
14 recommendations including: the need for 
a fully comprehensive policy for all nuclear 
waste; co-ordination of all UK research; the 
site selection process; the need for a clear 
policy for the UK's stock of separated 
plutonium; waste substitution; and that the 
Government should act without delay noting 
that “the programme for repository 
development is a long one and cannot be 
rushed …”. 
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Following the publication of the House of 
Lords’ Select Committee report, a Consensus 
Conference of “informed citizens” was held 
in London in May 1999 [13]. They concluded, 
inter alia, that radioactive waste must be 
stored underground in a monitorable and 
retrievable way regardless of cost; a neutral 
body should deal with waste management; 
the criteria for site selection should be open 
and publicised; decision making must be 
open and transparent; nuclear power should 
not be expanded until a way is found to deal 
adequately with the waste. 
 
In October 1999 the Government gave its 
initial response to the House of Lords Select 
Committee’s report [14]. One major aspect of 
that response was that the Department of 
Environment Transport and the Regions 
(DETR) announced that a Government 
consultation would be established. The 
consultation paper (Managing Radioactive 
Waste Safely “MRWS”) was issued in 
September 2001 [15] by the new Department 
of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA, now “Defra”)  and the Devolved 
Administrationsi. A key point was that whilst 
previous policy (and indeed the House of 
Lords’ report) centred on disposal as the 
long-term radioactive waste management 
option, the consultation paper assumed that 
all options would be under consideration. 
 
In April 2005, the Nuclear Decommissioning 
Authority (NDA), a non-departmental 
Government body, was formally established 
under the 2004 Energy Act, with the task 
decommissioning and cleaning up nuclear 
sites. At the same time Nirex was made 
independent of the nuclear industry through 
a Ministerial decision. Its shares, previously 
held by UKAEA, BNFL and British Energy, 
transferred to a Company Limited by 
Guarantee, jointly owned by Defra and DTI. 
Under the arrangements Nirex remains 
independent of and separate from the NDA, 
but its funding comes through a funding 
agreement between the two parties. 
 
2.3 Decommissioning policy 
When each of the UK’s operational nuclear 
power stations and other nuclear facilities 
come to the end of their operational life 
they have to be decommissioned. Over a 
period of time (which may be several 
decades) the plant will be dismantled and 
i Note that long-term radioactive waste 
management is a devolved issues. Therefore the 
MRWS programme is a joint undertaking by 
Defra, the Scottish Executive, the Department of 
the Environment of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly and the Welsh Assembly. 
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 radioactive waste will be removed and 
managed in a staged process, leading to the 
eventual demolition of the plant and site 
clearance to an agreed end-state.  
The policy of the Government and Devolved 
Administrations [16] was published in 
September 2004 and replaces that given in 
Cm 2919. Some key points of the policy are 
that: 
 
• Decommissioning should be carried out 
as soon as reasonably practicable taking 
all relevant factors into account 
(including knowledge and skills) on a 
case-by-case basis;  
• Each nuclear site operator is expected to 
produce and maintain decommissioning 
strategies and plans which will be 
reviewed by the Regulators every 5 
years, take into account the views of 
local stakeholders and the proposed 
future use of the site; 
• The plans should be presented in a 
transparent way and take account of 
safety, security, waste minimisation 
through Best Practicable Means (BPM), 
environmental impact, resources etc.;  
• The site’s end-state and future use 
should be considered along with the 
wishes of the local community. An 
overriding consideration will be whether 
it represents the “Best Practicable 
Environmental Option” (BPEO); 
• Consideration needs to be given to the 
policy development under the MRWS 
programme and avoid waste creation of 
forms that would foreclose future 
management options; 
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• If possible waste should not be created 
until there is a management route, but 
[it is recognised] that some waste will 
need to be packaged for storage rather 
than disposal and in a manner which 
does not preclude disposal. This should 
be done in accordance with the 
regulatory arrangements for the 
conditioning of ILW and the Nirex Letter 
of Comfort system (see Section 3.3.1); 
• Radioactive discharges to the 
environment should reflect application of 
ALARA (As low as reasonably achievable) 
and BPM principles; 
• Operators are expected to ensure that 
decommissioning is adequately funded, 
noting that the NDA will be funded 
directly by the Government; 
• Under BE’s restructuring plan they will 
pay into the Nuclear Liabilities Fund 
(NLF) to cover their decommissioning 
costs. The fund will be underwritten by 
Governmentii. 
• The Government are committed to 
ensure that the application of regulatory 
controls is transparent, the key parts of 
which are the site licence and discharge 
authorisations, and the requirements of 
the Nuclear Reactors (Environment 
Impact Assessment for 
Decommissioning) Regulations 1999;  
• Operators should maintain the 
knowledge base and skills necessary for 
decommissioning and waste 
management; 
• New facilities should be designed and 
built so as to minimise decommissioning 
wastes and costs, thus minimising the 
liabilities for future generations.  
 
2.4 The MRWS programme 
2.4.1 General 
The Government responded to the House of 
Lords Select Committee report in October 
1999, and recognized the need for a period 
of reflection [17] and detailed their intention 
to consult widely on the issues arising. The 
Government confirmed the need for 
openness and transparency in its approach. 
As a result the Managing Radioactive Waste 
Safely (“MRWS”) programme was launched 
in September 2001 []. 
 
An initial consultation posed questions on:  
 
• The size and scale of the problem;  
ii Note: the NDA draft strategy document 
indicates that they, on behalf of DTI, oversee BE’s 
decommissioning plans. 
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 • How the views of the public will 
contribute to the policy making process; 
• Any organisational changes needed to 
ensure that a sound policy is chosen and 
implemented; 
• The programme for the development and 
implementation of policy.  
 
The Government recognised the need to 
“inspire public confidence” in future 
decisions on policy development and 
proposed to set up an independent 
authoritative body (which became CoRWM) 
to advise it on information requirements for 
future decision making on options. 
 
A proposed “rough guide” five-stage 
programme was set out for “illustrative 
purposes” in the MRWS document. Following 
initial consultation it was amended to a four-
stage process. The programme has also 
slipped by about six months and the 
amended timetable is shown in Table 1.  
 
The Government acknowledged that the 
shape and speed of the programme was 
dependant on many factors but said “we 
must press ahead as quickly as we can. But 
we must also get the decisions right, and 
ensure that the strategy wins public 
confidence”. 
 
The MRWS paper also recognised that issues 
other than process needed to be addressed: 
 
• the principle of segregating UK waste 
types by half-lives; 
• management of spent sealed sources; 
• the link between waste substitution and 
the availability of a repository or other 
facility; 
• the general approach to 
decommissioning, recognising the lack of 
a national disposal facility; 
• consideration of the UK stockpile of 
plutonium, including whether some 
(other than for “minimal” defence 
requirements) should be declared a 
waste or be regarded as a potential 
resource through MOX fuel fabrication; 
and 
• consideration of the long-term 
management of uranium, including 
whether some proportion should be 
declared as waste; again the issue is 
determining between waste and 
resource 
 
The first stage of the consultation was 
completed in March 2002 and in order to 
oversee Stage 2 the Committee on 
Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) 
was established in November 2003 as an 
independent review body to oversee the 
evaluation of long-term waste management 
options and to make recommendations to 
Government. 
 
Note that with regard to LLW, the policy is 
for near surface disposal at the National Low 
Level Waste Repository at Drigg, Cumbria. 
Defra and the Devolved Administrations are 
currently implementing a consultation 
programme looking at the future policy for 
the management of LLW, which has been 
established in recognition of the fact that 
future LLW arising, e.g. from 
decommissioning nuclear power stations, is 
expected to exceed the existing capacity of 
the National LLW disposal facility. This will 
also consider how to give extra flexibility to 
deal with the wide-ranging wastes, including 
very low level wastes. Such LLW also has to 
be managed in the long-term, although in 
this area, in contrast to higher activity 
radioactive waste, the key issue is how best 
to do this using a range of solutions which 
already exist. 
 
2.4.2 CoRWM and options 
In creating CoRWM the Government 
acknowledged that even if no new nuclear 
plants are built, the country still has a 
substantial nuclear legacy. The options for 
dealing with some 500,000 tonnes (te) of 
higher activity waste, which will arise over 
the next hundred years, will include 
consideration of underground disposal and 
surface storage. CoRWM’s main focus is on 
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 the UK's high and intermediate level waste; 
there is a separate Government review for 
management options for low-level waste. As 
a result of the creation of CoRWM, the 
Radioactive Waste Management Advisory 
Committee (RWMAC) was suspended. 
 
CoRWM is an independent committee 
appointed jointly by the UK Government and 
Devolved Administrations to oversee a 
review of options and to recommend the 
option, or combination of options, that can 
provide a long-term radioactive waste 
management solution. Details of the 
Committee’s workings, membership details 
etc. can be found on its website 
www.corwm.org.uk. Note that CoRWM was 
not asked in its terms of reference to 
consider new build, but it recognised that if 
it was to address stakeholder concerns 
during its process, the issue was 
unavoidable.  
 
CoRWM was asked to ensure that the review 
of options was carried out in an open, 
transparent and inclusive manner, engaging 
members of the UK public and key 
stakeholders, and providing them with the 
opportunity to express their views. It is 
explicitly not considering potential sites as 
part of its work, but is considering generic 
issues that could affect the siting process.  
CoRWM will make recommendations to the 
Government in July 2006 but will publish its 
initial findings in April 2006. 
 
Notably, CoRWM was specifically asked to 
consider all options starting with a “blank 
sheet of paper”, and to eliminate as soon as 
practicable those which stood no realistic 
chance of implementation. CoRWM and the 
MRWS programme in general has come 
under some criticism, notably by the House 
of Lords Science and Technology Select 
Committee  [18]. They criticised, inter alia, the 
“blank sheet of paper” approach and the 
make-up of the Committee. They also said 
that “The Government must no longer allow 
delays in developing a long-term radioactive 
waste management strategy to be used as a 
pretext for deferring decisions on the future 
of nuclear power”. 
 
In July 2005, CoRWM short-listed the 
following options for detailed assessment 
(see schematic diagrams in Figure 1): 
 
1 Long term interim storage and its 
variants: 
¾ Local to current waste location, 
above ground, protected (e.g. from 
“9/11” style attack); 
¾ Local, above ground, unprotected; 
¾ Local, below ground, protected; 
¾ Centralised, above ground, 
protected; 
¾ Centralised, above ground, 
unprotected; 
¾ Centralised, below ground, 
protected; 
 
2 Deep geological disposal: 
¾ Deep disposal; 
¾ Disposal in boreholes; 
 
3 Phased deep geological disposal (the 
Nirex approach); 
 
4 Non geological disposaliii (near surface) 
for reactor decommissioning wastes 
only: 
¾ Near surface engineered vault, local 
to current wastes, protected;  
¾ Near surface engineered vault, 
centralised, protected;  
¾ Mounded over reactors;  
¾ “Forsmark” (as in Sweden) type 
vault (shallow, less than 100m) 
disposal, centralised; 
¾ “Forsmark” type vault (shallow, 
less than 100m) disposal, local; 
 
                                                
iii If this option was implemented. In addition, 
other options would be required for the other 
waste streams. 
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2.4.3 Option selection and societal 
implications 
Int oduction
The disposal options are the only 
“permanent” waste management options 
being discussed by CoRWM. The storage 
options are not permanent solutions, and are 
only being considered for up to 300 years. 
The length of time that active management 
of a facility would need to be maintained 
will depend on the option chosen and the 
way it is implemented. For example, if 
indefinite storage was implemented, active 
management will be required for hundreds 
of thousands of years. If disposal is 
implemented it could take about a hundred 
years to construct the facility, emplace all 
the radioactive wastes and then backfill and 
close the facility. If a phased approach to 
disposal is chosen the facility could be 
maintained as an underground store for 
several hundred years before being closed. 
 
The longevity of human organisations or 
civilisations and likelihood of societal 
collapse is therefore a factor to be 
considered when assessing the options. 
Nirex undertook a study [19] to outline 
examples of societies, organisations and 
archives that have been maintained and/or 
lost and some implications this may have for 
long-term radioactive waste management. 
The following paragraphs summarise the 
findings and conclusions. In summary, a 
range of factors were identified in the study 
as being important for the survival or loss of 
civilisations, organisations and objects. It 
was found that survival is strongly 
influenced by the wider context, or chance, 
or being in the right place at the right time. 
 
Surviva of civilisations and organisations  
In the study no examples were found of 
societies or organisations existing over 
timescales that radioactive waste will 
remain hazardous (i.e. hundreds of 
thousands of years). Therefore, it does not 
appear to be possible to rely on an 
organisation or society to manage 
radioactive waste over these timescales. 
 
Survival of information
Long-term radioactive waste management 
will rely on the preservation and transfer of 
information and is a major consideration by 
radioactive waste management 
organisations worldwide and by the IAEA. 
The study showed that the management 
system is more important for survival than 
the media used, and showed that the 
greatest threat to information transfer will 
be institutional change. 
 
External events 
The study gave examples of a number of 
external events that could influence stability, 
such as wars, collapses of civilisation and 
climate change. However, it cautioned that it 
was the more ‘trivial’ causes that could lead 
to problems, such as the destruction of 
archives by paper decay.  
 
The examples were: 
 
• Climate change has brought about 
civilisation collapse in the past for 
example, the Vikings. Current climate 
change will be a major threat to global 
stability, causing conflict and chaos. 
• Disease, and overuse of resources have 
caused civilisation collapse in for 
example Easter Island. Water is an 
increasingly scarce resource and is 
thought to be a likely cause of future 
major conflict. Disease, such as avian 
influenza, is a continuing threat to 
civilisation through pandemic.  
• The UK is currently dependent on trade 
links with other countries and even if it 
were safe from collapse due to its 
advanced technology, collapse in more 
vulnerable could have a major impact 
here.  
• A natural disaster (tsunami, hurricane) 
can turn possibly the most developed, 
complex society into a scene of anarchy 
and starvation, with loss of institutional 
control, in a matter of hours.  
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 In the case of a radioactive waste 
management facility that requires ongoing 
management, the time collapse takes, from 
the first warnings to the end would be 
extremely important, as would 
understanding and acting upon the earliest 
warning signs. The report concluded that if a 
management option requiring long-term 
societal control were to be implemented, it 
might be instructive to consider what, if any, 
consistent warning signals exist. 
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Resou ces
Long-term radioactive waste management 
will require skills and funding over the time 
period when active maintenance of the 
facility is required.  
 
• Skills and personnel loss in the nuclear 
field has already occurred following the 
collapse of the USSR and is already a 
concern in the UK nuclear industry. 
• Funding continuity for long-term 
radioactive management is important if 
the facility requires active maintenance 
over thousands of years. To fulfil the 
principle of intergenerational equity, the 
financial burden of waste produced by 
our generation must not be passed on to 
future generations. However, even if the 
money were invested now to be used in 
the future the likelihood of a bank 
surviving over the timescales involved is 
low and it is possible that this basic 
ethical principle can not be fulfilled. 
 
2.4.4 Post CoRWM and future policy 
implementation 
CoRWM will make its recommendation to 
Government in its final form in July 2006. 
Stage 2 of the MRWS programme will end 
with an announcement by Government on 
whether to accept, reject, or otherwise take 
on board that recommendation (possibly by 
the end of 2006). Stage 3 will be a 
consultation on implementation of the 
chosen policy. If needed, new legislation 
setting out the implementation programme 
will be put in place at the start of Stage 4.  
 
In the MRWS document, the Government 
indicated that the Stage 3 consultation 
should consider the site selection process. 
The failures of the past site selection 
processes in summary include the HLW 
programme of the 1970’s, the initial shallow 
and deep siting programmes which ended in 
1987, and finally, the deep repository 
programme which ended at Sellafield in 
1997. However, it is important to note the 
context for the past site selection exercises 
and how this would be different if siting of a 
deep geological repository (or other 
centralised facility, or even a new nuclear 
power station) were to be considered again 
under the Government’s MRWS consultation 
process. The following paragraphs 
summarise the main changes that have 
taken place since the previous site selection 
process and how they could affect a future 
site selection process. Input here includes 
work done by Nirex to review the last site 
selection programme [20].  
 
The repository concept
The repository concept under consideration 
in the last siting exercise was based on one 
intended to be backfilled and sealed as soon 
as possible after waste emplacement. In 
response to extensive stakeholder demands, 
Nirex has since developed the Phased 
Geological Repository Concept which is one 
of the options being considered by CoRWM 
(see also section 3.3.2). This allows the 
monitoring of the waste in underground 
storage for up to several hundred years until 
society takes the decision to backfill, seal 
and close the repository or manage the 
waste in some other way. 
 
There has also been a significant amount of 
repository research in the UK and overseas 
such that the understanding of a host site’s 
requirement has been refined which may 
affect the geological characteristics that 
would be sought for potential sites. 
 
Stakeholder involvement in the site 
selection process
The lessons learned from the failure of the 
previous site selection process will 
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 undoubtedly be applied in any future site 
selection process, to ensure that it is open, 
transparent and inclusive and that there is 
stakeholder involvement and influence. As 
implied above, Stage 3 may not begin to 
consider a new site selection process until 
2007/8. Therefore, a number of aspects 
could be different in any future site selection 
process to encourage and ensure greater 
stakeholder involvement, including how 
local community and other stakeholders are 
involved, site evaluation criteria and their 
relative weights (which would need to be 
agreed before the site selection phase 
itself); the ability to volunteer and the power 
to veto siting decisions, and community 
benefits. 
 
The volume and types of waste being 
considered 
The volume of intermediate-level waste and 
low-level waste under consideration in the 
1980s totalled two million cubic metres. The 
volume of waste under consideration now is 
significantly smaller. The Nirex note 
indicated that under the 2001 Inventory 
assumptions, the total volume to be 
emplaced in a repository (if that were the 
chosen option) would be 237,000m3 of ILW 
and 15,000m3, of LLW. The latest 2004 
assumptions would, of course, revise these 
estimates further (see section 3.2). The 
decrease in estimated volumes is due to 
taking account only of committed LLW and  
 
ILW, rather than also projected volumes 
under various scenarios and the routing of all 
but a small volume of LLW to Drigg. 
 
In addition, no consideration was given 
historically to HLW, spent fuel and other 
materials not yet declared as wastes such as 
plutonium and uranium. These wastes could 
also be considered for inclusion in the 
repository concept. These changes will affect 
the size of the repository, and therefore the 
size of the site that is required and also the 
geological requirements of the site. (See 
also section 3.3.2). 
 
Advances in understanding 
The UK’s geology has, of course, not changed 
over the past 20 years, but the ability to 
investigate and model deep geology and the 
understanding of deep geological processes 
has improved significantly. Therefore, there 
are more favourable indicators of geological 
suitability, in addition to those recognised 
previously. 
 
Improved surveying methods as used in the 
French and Swiss radioactive waste 
management programmes could bring in 
geological settings that were previously 
viewed as difficult to investigate. Major 
advances in computer technology mean that 
geological settings previously excluded as 
‘too complex to model’ could now be 
considered and produce different results 
when screening sites against geological 
criteria. Also there is an improved 
understanding of the geological barrier 
which together with a better understanding 
of relevant geological processes means that 
different geological settings could now be 
included or excluded. 
 
Legislative developments 
The Aarhus Convention [21] came into force in 
2001. It aims to protect and improve the 
environment and ensure sustainable and 
environmentally sound development. The 
convention aims to allow public access to 
information, enable citizen participation in 
decisions, give them access to 
environmental justice with provision of 
assistance to exercise their rights, increase 
accountability and transparency in decision 
making and increase public support forn 
decisions. 
 
The requirements of the Aarhus Convention 
are transposed in UK legalisation [ 22] that 
implements the European Union’s Strategic 
Environmental Assessment Directive [23] (see 
also guidance published by the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister, [24]) and the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 
[25]. Sustainability appraisals also have to be 
undertaken for developments in the UK [26] 
to ensure the social, environmental and 
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 economic impacts of proposals are assessed 
and mitigated if possible. 
 
Together these pieces of legislation make 
stakeholder involvement in the early stages 
of a decision-making process compulsory, 
they give stakeholders the right to influence 
the scope of the assessments to be 
undertaken and the decision-making process 
itself. 
 
Stepwise decision-making 
International experience [27, 28, 29, 30] shows 
that EIA and SEA can be used to: 
 
• Engage stakeholders in dialogue about a 
long-term solution to radioactive waste 
and structure the work undertaken; 
• Define and communicate the scientific 
and technical work;  
• Integrate scientific and social research on 
radioactive waste management into the 
decision-making process; and   
• Encourage and enable stakeholder 
involvement in the decision-making 
process.  
 
Research [31, 32, 33, 34] has shown that a 
stepwise approach to decision-making 
regarding long-term radioactive waste 
management is important because it: 
 
• Enables flexibility to be built into the 
process; 
• Provides clear decision points; 
• Enhances stakeholder involvement, 
transparency and auditability; 
• Enables steps to be reversed if necessary. 
 
SEA and EIA provide frameworks with clearly 
defined steps. Therefore, they could be used 
to structure the decision-making process 
relating to long-term radioactive waste 
management in the UK. Moreover, a 
Sustainability Appraisal (SA) could be 
undertaken to ensure that all the relevant 
issues are addressed. The UK guidance on 
Sustainability Appraisal [26] aims to align 
the requirements of SA and SEA in a single 
assessment. Both processes have similar 
stages, but Sustainability Appraisal considers 
social and economic as well as 
environmental issues. 
 
Siting has been seen as the most 
controversial and difficult stage in 
developing a long-term radioactive waste 
management facility. Therefore, it is 
important that the process of site 
investigation and selection is seen as 
legitimate and has stakeholder support. 
Nirex believes that the site selection process 
should be structured using the SEA and EIA 
frameworks as outlined in Figure 2. 
 
UK Guidance on SEA outlines the stages in 
the process as follows can be mapped onto 
the decision-making process for identifying a 
short-list of potential sites as outlined in 
Table 2. The steps involved in an EIA are 
outlined in a European Commission Report 
on EIA and geological repositories [27] can 
be mapped onto the process for 
recommending a preferred site as shown in 
Table 3. Working groups could be set up in 
potential host communities to enable the 
local community to scrutinise the work of 
the implementer and make inputs into the 
decision-making process. Mechanisms 
similar to those used in Belgium [35] and 
Sweden [36] could be used and funding for 
these would need to be provided. 
 
To provide provisioning advice to radioactive 
waste producers, Nirex has developed a 
baseline programme that outlines the stages 
needed to implemented a deep geological 
repository and estimates of how long that 
would take. It is estimated that a site could 
be selected for underground research by 
2020 and a repository could be available by 
2040. The Finnish experience, outlined in 
section 4.7.4, indicates some 18 years to get 
to a final site choice. 
 
The NDA has called for a repository to be 
available by 2025 to allow their plans for 
reactor decommissioning in 25 years to be 
delivered. Even if CoRWM were to 
recommend a form of geological disposal as 
its preferred option, and this becomes UK 
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 policy, it is unlikely that a permanent 
solution to long-term waste management 
will be available on the NDA timescale. This 
is due to the necessary siting, R&D, planning 
and construction programmes which must be 
implemented, including the necessary 
legislative requirements as outlined above. 
The repository siting programme would be 
more than just a scientific exercise, it would 
involve an important social and ethical 
dimension and stakeholder interaction. As 
such, 2025 may not be unachievable if due 
process leads to a willing host community 
coming forward, and that the overall 
progress is at the speed desired by 
stakeholders, rather than that desired by the 
nuclear industry.
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 3 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE 
 
 
 
3.1 General 
Radioactive waste is generated in the UK by 
a range of nuclear and non-nuclear activities. 
Waste has been generated and continues to 
be generated from nuclear power 
generation, spent fuel reprocessing, 
research, industrial and military 
programmes. Further, wastes will also result 
from future decommissioning of nuclear 
facilities. The waste itself contains a wide 
range of levels of radioactivity (see Box 1 
[37]). 
 
Wastes are currently stored in interim 
storage facilities on regulated nuclear sites 
over the short and medium term (of the 
order decades). The HSE expects nuclear site 
licensees to manage radioactive waste such 
that it is compatible with future potential 
disposal options, and unless justified on 
safety grounds, does not foreclose 
foreseeable management options. A Nirex 
“Letter of Compliance” issued for a particular 
processed waste form and packaging is an 
important part of this demonstration. This 
system has developed since the late 1980’s 
and has been used to judge the acceptability 
of all intermediate level waste packages 
produced in the UK. 
 
There are a number of “unconditioned” 
waste streams (legacy wastes which are not 
in a passively safe form), particularly at the 
Sellafield reprocessing site, which are stored 
in facilities that whilst considered acceptable 
at the time, now pose a number of 
significant challenges with respect to 
management and decommissioning of the 
facilities – see Box 1 [38]. 
 
3.2 Inventory of radioactive 
materials 
3.2.1 Radioactive waste 
Defra and Nirex periodically publish an 
inventory of radioactive waste in the UK. This 
inventory provides a reference source of 
information for Government and its 
agencies, Nirex, and others with a role or 
interest in the management of radioactive 
waste. The latest version considers stocks of 
wastes in store and predicted to arise in the 
future under current plans as at April 2004 
and was published in October 2005 [39]. 
 
The report includes all the higher activity 
materials which have been declared as 
wastes. For a discussion on material not yet 
declared as wastes see the next section. As 
reported in the 2004 Inventory, the total 
volume of radioactive waste that exists 
today and is forecast to arise in the future is 
2.3 million m3, comprising 2.1 million m3 of 
LLW (mainly unconditioned); 220,000m3 of 
ILW and 1,300m3 of vitrified HLW. Note the 
ILW volume of 220,000m3 is a combination 
of conditioned waste in stock and future 
arisings; the estimated final conditioned 
volume is 240,000m3.  
 
A further 1 million m3 has already been 
produced and disposed of. This is primarily 
LLW disposed of at Drigg and Dounreay, but 
includes a small amount of ILW disposed of 
at sea. Under existing scenarios about 95% 
(2.2 million m3) of the radioactive waste 
total already exists and is being held in 
stores as noted above, but much of it, 1.6 
million m3, will arise as waste when facilities 
are decommissioned. 
 
The other 5% (100,000m3) of the total has 
yet to be produced and is that forecast from 
the future planned nuclear operations (not 
including decommissioning which is covered 
in the “existing” total), ongoing defence 
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 programmes and continued use of 
radioactivity for medical and industrial 
purposes. The volumes referred to assume 
the following scenario: 
 
• Nuclear power stations 
¾ Remaining operational power 
stations shut down over the period 
from 2006 to 2035; 
¾ No new nuclear power stations are 
constructed; 
¾ Main reactor structures left on site 
for about 100 years before final 
site clearance; 
• Spent fuel reprocessing continues until 
financial year 2012/13; 
• The Joint European Torus fusion 
experiment shuts down in 2006; 
• Defence: 
¾ A continuing nuclear defence 
capability to 2040; 
¾ A continuing nuclear-powered 
submarine programme to 2100 
• Medical and industrial sources usage 
continues as today. 
 
3.2.2 Other radioactive materials and 
VLLW 
Spent nuclear fuel, plutonium and uranium 
are not currently classified as wastes due to  
their potential use as resource, but they too 
also require safely managing pending 
availability of a long-term management 
route. CoRWM are addressing this subject as 
part of their programme. Spent nuclear fuel 
from the UK’s Magnox and AGR nuclear 
power stations is transported to Sellafield for 
reprocessing, where the waste products 
(HLW, ILW) are stored in interim storage 
facilities; LLW arisings are consigned to 
Drigg. Spent fuel is stored in ponds where 
the water provides both shielding and 
cooling. The separated plutonium and 
uranium arising from reprocessing is also 
stored. Spent nuclear fuel from Sizewell B 
PWR power station is not reprocessed and is 
stored in storage ponds. 
 
In 2003 Nirex undertook a study [40] to look 
at what additional materials there were 
which could be declared as radioactive 
wastes. The report identified volumes of 
wastes not included in the Inventory 
reference case as described above. A 
summary of the findings of that report, 
updated as appropriate was presented in 
Nirex report N/122 [41] and has been used to 
provide the information below. 
 
Plutonium 
Plutonium is a radioactive element created 
as a by-product in nuclear reactors. It can be 
separated from nuclear fuel by reprocessing. 
Separated plutonium can be used as a 
nuclear fuel and in nuclear weapons. 
 
There are currently 93te of separated 
plutonium in the UK, most of this material is 
held in store at Sellafield in oxide form as a 
powder. A small quantity may be returned to 
overseas countries. Some plutonium is held 
for military purposes. The total quantity of 
separated plutonium will increase to 
approximately 140te under current 
reprocessing assumptions. In addition there 
is plutonium within spent fuel. For more 
discussion on the plutonium issue, see the 
next section. 
 
Uranium 
Uranium is a radioactive element that occurs 
in natural form as an ore which is mined and 
can be used for the manufacture of nuclear 
fuel and nuclear weapons. It is also a by-
product of spent fuel reprocessing. Less 
radioactive uranium (called depleted 
uranium) has more commonplace uses, such 
as counterweights in aircraft. Most uranium 
is stored either as gaseous uranium 
hexafluoride or as an oxide powder. 
 
There are currently 100,000te of separated 
uranium held in a number of stores, 
principally at Springfields, stored in a 
number of forms including powder. A small 
quantity may be returned to overseas 
countries. Some uranium is held for military 
purposes. The total quantity of separated 
uranium will increase to approximately 
 
Waste and decommissioning www.sd-commission.org.uk 
 
14 
 150,000te under current reprocessing 
assumptions. In addition there is uranium 
within spent fuel. 
 
Spent fuel 
Spent nuclear fuel is fuel that has been 
irradiated in a nuclear reactor. By activity 
content it comprises 1% Pu, 96% U and 3% 
fission products. It can be reprocessed (to 
separate out plutonium and “unburnt” 
uranium) or managed in some other way. 
Like HLW, spent nuclear fuel is intensely 
radioactive and generates heat. It usually 
comprises uranium oxide, and contains 
fission products. 
 
Approximately 5,000te of UK spent nuclear 
fuel is currently held in stores at Sellafield, 
Dounreay and a number of reactor sites. 
Some of this fuel is planned to be 
reprocessed. There will also be more spent 
fuel generated from continued power 
generation. Under current plans it is 
estimated that 4,700te of spent fuel will not 
be reprocessed. 
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Contaminated land
Estimates of land contaminated with 
radioactivity have been made but are very 
uncertain. RWMAC [42] estimated the total 
amount in the UK to be of the order of 18 
million m3 (equivalent to 36 million te) of 
unconditioned material. Most of it is at 
Sellafield, Dounreay and Aldermaston. 
 
Radioactive sources
Approximately 10,000 sources are in use in 
the UK now, mainly for medical and 
industrial purposes. Most of these are 
returned to the manufacturers after use. 
Record keeping in this area has often been 
poor, resulting in the loss of sources. 
Radioactive sources exist in a wide variety of 
forms, from small metallic objects to gases 
and liquids. 
 
VLLW
Small quantities of waste can be routinely 
disposed of to domestic landfills. There are 
approximately 5 such sites in use in UK. 
VLLW may be lightly contaminated 
miscellaneous items such as laboratory 
equipment, gloves and medical wastes. 
 
Miscellaneous 
Some organisations have disposed of 
radioactive waste under other arrangements, 
either on a nuclear licensed site or local tips 
(estimated to be 10,000m3), or (before it 
was banned) in the sea (33,000m3).  
 
Some radioactive waste can be incinerated 
either at purpose built incinerators located 
on nuclear sites or domestic incinerators. 
 
All nuclear facilities may discharge 
radioactivity to the environment via liquid 
and aerial effluents under strictly controlled 
authorisations set by the UK regulators.  
 
3.2.3 Issues surrounding plutonium 
Plutonium is currently classed by the nuclear 
industry [50] as an asset with zero value, and 
not as a waste. UK-owned civil plutonium 
stocks have been created through the 
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel with the 
original intention of re-using this material in 
a future fast breeder reactor programme. 
 
It was believed in the 1950s and 1960s that 
a “closed” nuclear fuel cycle was the most 
desirable option for future energy supply. 
Fuel from nuclear reactors would be 
reprocessed after first use and the recovered 
plutonium would be recycled as fuel in fast 
breeder reactors. The fast breeder reactors 
would produce more plutonium, which could 
fuel other types of reactors. 
 
The UK fast breeder reactor programme, was 
however, formally cancelled in the early 
1990’s, closing this option for the use of 
plutonium, as the predicted uranium 
shortages did not occur. As a result, 
significant stockpiles of plutonium have 
arisen as a result of reprocessing operations. 
 
Suggestions have been made that plutonium 
should be classified as a waste and disposed 
of appropriately, rather than used as a future 
fuel. This issue is complex and may need to 
be addressed in any decision regarding new 
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 build in its potential use as MOX fuel (see 
section 5.6). The NDA has declared that 
reclassifying plutonium as a waste would 
add several billions of pounds to the total 
cost of dealing with the UK’s nuclear legacy. 
The NDA is planning to discuss with 
Government what proportion of plutonium 
should be regarded as a strategic stock, 
which could be used as a potential future 
energy source, leaving the remainder as 
waste. Further details of the implications of 
reclassifying plutonium as a waste can be 
seen in references [43] and [44]. 
 
CoRWM’s position paper on plutonium [45] 
notes that plutonium storage arrangements 
at Sellafield are satisfactory for the 
immediate future (approximately 25 years). 
They are only viewed as an interim measure 
for two reasons:  
 
• The storage of plutonium dioxide powder 
cannot be considered as ‘passively safe’. 
There are maintenance and monitoring 
requirements. Human intervention Is 
required to maintain safety.  
• There is increasing international pressure 
to reduce stockpiles of separated 
plutonium.  
 
If plutonium were to be classified as a 
waste, for security reasons it would need 
immobilizing in a stable wasteform, suitable 
for long-term management, and does not 
necessarily discount recycling options in the 
future, although it is recognised that 
immobilisation would make recycling much 
more difficult. Immobilised plutonium, 
however, would require additional 
processing steps to enable its re-extraction.  
 
Two of the aims of immobilisation are:  
 
• Proliferation resistance: the plutonium is 
rendered unattractive to any potential 
illegal use, for example, as the nuclear 
explosive in an atomic device or 
radioactive ‘dirty’ bomb.  
• Disposability: the plutonium will be 
conditioned in an acceptable way for 
possible disposal.  
 
There are a range of different immobilization 
methods, including cementation, vitrification 
and ceramification, which are described in 
more detail in the CoRWM position paper.  
 
3.2.4 Scenario variations  
CoRWM established a baseline inventory of 
radioactive wastes and materials on which it 
will make its recommendations [46]. As 
acknowledged in the reference, this was 
principally derived from the draft 2004 
Inventory data and whilst some of the 
underpinning data may have been modified 
in the move to the final version, this is not 
expected to materially affect either this 
analysis or conclusions. 
 
CoRWM made the following principal 
assumptions. 
 
Nuclear power reactors: 
 
• All operating Magnox reactors are shut 
down by 2010; 
• AGRs operate for up to 35 years, with the 
last shutdown in 2023; 
• Sizewell B PWR operates for 40 years 
and is shutdown in 2035; 
• No new nuclear power reactors are 
constructed. 
 
Spent fuel reprocessed: 
 
• All Magnox fuel (55,000tU); 
• AGR fuel covered by existing contracts 
(5,000tU); 
• Overseas LWR fuel covered by existing 
contracts (4,500tU); 
• Return of overseas Pu, U and HLW, with 
ILW & LLW substitution. 
                                                                                 
Radioactive materials if these are  to be                                
managed as wastes: 
 
• All UK stockpile of separated plutonium 
(102te); 
• All UK stockpile of uranium (153,000te); 
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 • AGR fuel not covered by existing 
reprocessing contracts (3,500tU); 
• Sizewell B PWR fuel (1,200tU). 
• All radioactive wastes, including spent 
fuel, are packaged so that they are in a 
form suitable for long-term 
management.  
 
The baseline inventory includes all wastes 
both in existence and forecast to arise in the 
future (from e.g. decommissioning). Their 
baseline volume was 477,860m3 as 
indicated below. [Note, care should be taken 
in comparing these figures, which represent 
packaged volumes, with the ones in the 
previous section.] CoRWM further considered 
changes in the above assumptions to the 
baseline scenario as follows:  
 
• The building of new nuclear power 
reactors (discussed in more detail later in 
section 5.1); 
• The quantity of spent fuel reprocessed; 
• ILW and LLW substitution (return 
additional HLW in place of ILW from 
reprocessing overseas spent fuel); 
• Lifetimes of existing nuclear power 
reactors; 
• Decay storage and decontamination of 
ILW (for disposal as LLW); 
• Early decommissioning of nuclear power 
reactors; 
• Waste segregation (of short-lived ILW; of 
mixed ILW/LLW streams); 
• Quantity of unaccounted spent sealed 
radiation sources (SSRSs). 
 
They concluded the potential for changes 
(+/-) in the baseline volume of 477,860m3 
for various scenarios on spent fuel, HLW,ILW, 
plutonium, uranium and LLW could be as 
shown in the following table which has been 
adapted from their inventory summary 
document – see Table 4. Volume and activity 
comparisons are summarised in section 5.3. 
 
Regarding non-Drigg LLW, baseline volume 
37,200m3, CoRWM noted that the nature of 
most of the waste - activated reactor core 
graphite – would make it difficult to treat in 
order that it would be acceptable for 
disposal to Drigg. There may be some 
uncertainty in the relative quantities of ILW 
and LLW reactor graphite, but this will not 
affect the inventory. 
 
3.3 Waste packaging and storage 
3.3.1 The letter of compliance process 
Prior to the Government making any 
decision on future radioactive waste 
management policy, they and the regulators 
have deemed it appropriate that 
unconditioned and decommissioning ILW 
should continue to be packaged under the 
Nirex Letter of Compliance (LoC) system. 
Endorsement of this process during the 
period for which CoRWM is deliberating was 
given by the Governments cross-
Government Radioactive Waste Management 
Policy Group, which noted that the LoC 
process gave a good level of compatibility 
with the likely options being considered by 
CoRWM, and that packaging should not be 
delayed during the review of options. 
 
Since it was established in 1982 the Nirex 
role has included development of ILW waste 
package standards and specifications 
necessary to produce waste packages 
compatible with a planned repository. 
 
Since the mid-1980s, many waste producers 
have invested in conditioning and packaging 
plants to process waste immediately after 
creation and to treat initiate retrieval of 
historic legacy wastes, using the standards 
and specifications to guide their 
development. Through issuing a Letter of 
Compliance (“LoC”, originally “Letter of 
Comfort”) Nirex indicated when the 
proposed waste packages were compatible 
with the disposal concept being developed.  
 
In January 2004 improved arrangements 
were introduced by the regulators [47] 
requiring that safety cases covering the ILW 
conditioning plants also address the 
disposability of the waste packages. The LoC 
assessment is seen as the primary means of 
obtaining the safety case. This change gives 
 
Waste and decommissioning www.sd-commission.org.uk 
 
17 
 increased confidence to regulators and other 
stakeholders that the long-term 
management of waste packages is 
considered before they are manufactured. 
The process comes under the regulatory 
scrutiny of the Environment Agency of 
England and Wales (EA), and its counterpart 
in Scotland, the Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency (SEPA) which advises the 
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) on 
waste package disposability. 
 
As noted earlier, the revised arrangements 
are also recognised within the Government’s 
updated policy on decommissioning of UK 
nuclear facilities issued in September 2004 . 
The policy update confirms that operators 
should continue to process decommissioning 
wastes in accordance with Nirex LoC 
arrangements. 
 
In March 2005, NII, EA and SEPA issued 
“Guidance to Industry” [48] on the operation 
of the improved arrangements requiring that 
site operators set out the strategy for 
retrieving, conditioning, storage and 
ultimate disposal of wastes. The ILW 
Conditioning Proposal is required to justify 
the selected packaging option based on 
consideration of BPEO (Best Practicable 
Environmental Option) and BPM (Best 
Practicable Means) and a disposability case 
as described previously. 
 
3.3.2 Repository concept 
A fundamental principle of the LoC system is 
that in the absence of a repository, and thus 
the absence of waste acceptance criteria, 
there is still a repository concept against 
which the disposability of ILW packaging 
proposals can be assessed. Part of the Nirex 
remit since its inception has therefore 
involved the development of the repository 
concept. This has evolved over the years to 
take account of changing waste volumes and 
other factors, principally the inclusion of 
monitoring and retrievabilty, to what is now 
described as the Phased Geological 
Repository Concept (PGRC). This is described 
in more detail in Nirex Report N/122, [41] 
referred to earlier, and in Nirex Report 
N/074 [49].  
 
In summary, the PGRC is a multi-barrier 
system comprising physical, chemical and 
geological barriers to ensure any 
radioactivity that returns to the human 
environment in the future is within 
acceptable levels (see The phased geological 
repository concept). Retrievability is a 
component part of the concept, as 
mentioned, and is achieved initially by 
operating the facility as a retrievable store in 
which the wastes can be maintained and if 
necessary retrieved. Decisions about how 
and if to proceed towards closure of the 
facility are offered to future generations 
without placing an undue burden on them. 
See Figure 3: The phased geological 
repository concept. 
 
Note that this concept is only for ILW and 
LLW not suitable for Drigg. With the 
encouragement of Government, Nirex has 
developed a repository concept for HLW and 
spent fuel. This is based on the Swedish KBS-
3 concept as being implemented in both 
Sweden and Finland. Again this is described 
in more detail in Nirex Report N/122 [41]. In 
addition Nirex is investigating the 
disposability of other materials such as 
separated stock of plutonium and uranium, 
and spent fuel from submarines and 
research reactors.  
 
3.3.3 Waste storage 
Interim storage is the status quo in the UK 
and it is the first stage of a long-term 
management strategy. In principle, there is a 
difference in the more recent design of 
stores (which take packaged wastes) that 
anticipate that a disposal option will be 
implemented in some tens of years, and 
historical stores (which were for untreated 
waste) whose lifetime represented the 
longest that technology could then achieve.  
 
Currently, HLW and ILW are stored in interim 
storage facilities at their sites of origin. There 
are several types of interim stores in use. 
These range from historical facilities built in 
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 the 1950’s and 60’s at, for example 
Sellafield, for which plans are now being 
drawn up to empty, treat and package the 
wastes and decommission, to more recent 
purpose built facilities, built in the last 
decade for packaged wastes. The design life 
for these newer facilities is of the order 50 
years, although it may be possible to extend 
their lifetime to 100 years given appropriate 
maintenance. 
 
3.4 Decommissioning 
3.4.1 General 
As noted above, the NDA are responsible for 
the decommissioning of nuclear facilities 
which in terms of civilian reactors currently 
applies to the Magnox fleet. The NDA has 
produced a draft strategy for consultation [50] 
for which the consultation period closed in 
November 2005. Although not published, the 
NDA had to submit the (revised) draft 
strategy following the consultation to 
Ministers by mid-December 2005 for which 
the Government must give its approval by 
the end of March 2006. 
 
The strategy document notes there are at 
least three main approaches to 
decommissioning reactor sites:  
 
1. The current approach is based on 
Government policy and the five-yearly 
review process: 
¾ This strategy is based on a period 
20 to 25 year period during which 
ancillary buildings are cleared an 
the reactor(s) placed into a care 
and maintenance regime. This 
would include for example 
construction of an interim ILW 
storage facility on site. This stage 
would then be followed by 80 to 
100 years of care and 
maintenance, before reactor 
dismantling and final site 
clearance.  
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 ¾ Decommissioning of AGRs would 
adopt a similar approach. With the 
design of Sizewell B (PWR), similar 
principles apply but with 
potentially differing timescales. 
(There is no graphite, it is a 
physically smaller reactor and 
easier to decommission.)  
 
2. British Nuclear Group’s proposed ‘Magnox 
Innovation’ approach: 
¾ as little as five years to reach care 
and maintenance and at a cost of 
£100m or less; 
¾ up to 100 years in care and 
maintenance.  
 
3. The NDA’s proposed approach: 
¾ defuelling, decommissioning and 
release of the site for alternative 
use in 25 years or less.  
 
3.4.2 Decommissioning approach 
British Energy Approach  
A British Energy review of the early 
Safestore strategy for their AGR & PWR 
reactors has recently been undertaken in 
response to the Regulator’s requirements for 
a review of all operators decommissioning 
strategies [51]. The overall conclusions of this 
study were:  
 
• Recent work on worker doses, waste 
volumes and types, underpins the 
various AGR decommissioning options, 
which acted as a driver for the early 
Safestore.  
• Assessments against legislation and 
Government policy showed that the early 
Safestore remains consistent and robust, 
but also flexible.  
• Assessments against potential changes in 
legislation that may be implemented in 
the future will not significantly impact on 
early Safestore strategy.  
• None of the recently highlighted issues 
foreclose the current British Energy early 
Safestore strategy.  
 
BNG Magnox Approach  
The Magnox Decommissioning Dialogue [52] 
was started in 2000, and has been 
progressing discussions between a wide 
 
19 
 range of stakeholders with the aim of 
identifying and exploring implications of 
decommissioning options. It focused on 
three scenarios: 
 
• prompt, uninterrupted decommissioning;  
• some prompt decommissioning with 
medium-term deferral of complete 
decommissioning;  
• some prompt decommissioning with 
long-term deferral of complete 
decommissioning. In the analysis of the 
scenarios, some variations were 
identified, e.g. on-site waste storage, 
and a rolling programme of 
decommissioning to completion across 
all sites.  
 
The resulting recommendations constituted 
BNG’s proposed “Magnox Innovation 
Approach”, with approximately 5 years to 
reach care and maintenance, at a cost of 
<£100M, with up to 100 years in care and 
maintenance. This would include:  
 
• Removal of fuel;  
• Retrench all radiological 
facilities/activities into one area of site;  
• Store operational ILW in the reactor 
building;  
• Dispose of LLW on site.  
 
This approach would achieve care and 
maintenance in about 5 years, and would 
provide one approach to the interim ILW 
storage problem. 
 
The NDA Approach  
The NDA’s long-term objective is to 
complete the decommissioning and clean up 
of sites for which it is responsible, and to 
make them available for other uses. The key 
issues for the NDA in waste management 
arising from the decommissioning of power 
stations are:  
 
• Whether and how to rationalise the 
interim storage of ILW  
• How to dispose of increasing volumes of 
LLW and to reduce the costs of disposal  
• How to manage the future capacity of 
the National Low Level Waste repository 
at Drigg, whose capacity is limited, and 
will not be able to take all LLW from 
decommissioning and cleanup operations  
• The NDA’s proposed approach for 
decommissioning is for defuelling, 
decommissioning and release of the site 
within 25 years.  
 
The strategy report suggests the main 
advantages of the NDA approach to include:  
 
• use of the existing knowledgeable 
workforce and associated socio-economic 
benefits for the local area; 
• earlier availability of the site for other 
uses; 
• fewer ILW interim stores needed with 
consequential cost savings;  
• visible signs of decommissioning and 
clean up,  
• mitigation of the potential threat of 
coastal erosion and climate change at a 
number of sites; 
 
They go on to say that the NDA’s proposed 
approach is similar to that adopted by EDF in 
France for the decommissioning of their gas-
cooled reactors and they note that in Japan, 
operators propose to decommission their 
Magnox reactor in 17 years, subject to the 
availability of a disposal solution.  
 
3.4.3 Current UK decommissioning 
experience  
In the UK, a number of research (non-
commercial power station) reactors have 
been fully decommissioned and the sites 
delicenced. These include the Risley 
Research Reactor and the Royal Naval JASON 
reactor at Greenwich.  
 
There are a number of UK commercial 
nuclear Magnox reactors which have now 
completed operations, and are at varying 
stages of decommissioning. These include 
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 Berkeley, Bradwell, Hinkley Point A, 
Hunterston A, Trawsfynydd, Chapelcross and 
Calder Hall. None has completed 
decommissioning. Berkeley is the most 
advanced; it ceased operation in 1989. 
Preparations for care and maintenance 
started in 1992 following defuelling, and is 
expected to reach care and maintenance 
stage in 2009. Details of the 
decommissioning progress and plans of at 
each of these power stations can be seen in 
the Life Cycle Base Lines which British 
Nuclear Group has prepared for the NDA, and 
are summarised in the strategy document 
referred to above. In addition, the future 
decommissioning plans of the operational 
Magnox reactors, for example Sizewell A, 
can also be seen.  
 
Decommissioning of the Windscale AGR is 
ongoing but projects have been completed 
to greenfield status for the Capenhurst 
Uranium enrichment plant and the 
plutonium fuel fabrication plant at Winfrith. 
 
3.5 Role of spent fuel 
reprocessing 
Spent fuel is fuel that is no longer capable of 
efficient fission due to the loss of fissile 
material and the build up of fission products 
and actinides. After approximately five years 
in the reactor, the spent fuel consists of 
about 96% unused uranium, 1% plutonium 
and about 3% highly active fission products 
and actinides. Reprocessing of spent fuel 
was envisaged as a means of extracting the 
used uranium and the plutonium for recycle 
in reactor fuel and, in the case of defence 
programmes, for use of the plutonium in the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons. 
 
The first reprocessing plant operated at 
Sellafield from 1952 to 1964. This 
reprocessed defence fuel from the Windscale 
Piles and fuel from the first Magnox reactors. 
There are now two reprocessing plants 
operating at Sellafield. One treats fuel from 
Magnox reactors, the other (THORP - Thermal 
Oxide Reprocessing Plant) treats oxide fuels 
from UK Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors 
(AGRs) and water-cooled reactors - 
principally overseas Pressurised Water 
Reactors (PWRs) and Boiling Water Reactors 
(BWRs). Reprocessing of fuel from research 
reactors and from the Prototype Fast Reactor 
(PFR) has been carried out in the past at 
Dounreay. The reprocessing methods and the 
types of wastes produced were similar to 
those at Sellafield, albeit on a much smaller 
scale. 
 
“Wet reprocessing”, as practised currently, 
relies on the initial chemical partitioning of 
the unwanted fission products and the 
uranium and plutonium between aqueous 
and organic phases respectively. In a 
subsequent stage of chemical partitioning 
the uranium and plutonium are separated. 
The aqueous fission product stream (“highly 
active raffinate”) is concentrated by 
evaporation and stored in cooled, high-
integrity stainless steel tanks pending 
vitrification. Vitrification is the process of 
converting the highly active liquors into a 
solid borosilicate glass. This vitrified high-
level waste product is placed within stainless 
steel containers, resulting in a waste form 
that is safe for long-term storage and that 
has been shown to be suitable for safe 
geological disposal in the waste 
management programmes of a number of 
countries that have sent fuel for 
reprocessing. 
 
A large number of operational ILW streams 
are generated as a result of the reprocessing 
of spent fuel including fuel cladding 
materials, sludges, ion exchange resins, 
plutonium contaminated materials (PCM), 
and hard trash from plant operations and 
maintenance. 
 
LLW represents much the largest volume of 
waste arising from spent fuel reprocessing. 
Operational LLW consists of a wide range of 
soft and hard trash from routine operations 
and maintenance. Waste items include 
discarded protective clothing, paper towels, 
general tools, filters, plastic bags and 
sheeting, pipework, cabling, glassware, 
redundant equipment, concrete, rubble and 
soil. Redundant fuel transport flasks and fuel 
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 storage pond furniture also contribute to the 
total of LLW. 
 
The two reprocessing plants at Sellafield are 
served by a number of facilities, including 
liquid effluent treatment plants and a variety 
of plants providing for the management of 
radioactive wastes. The main plants at 
Sellafield for liquid effluent treatment are 
the Site Ion Exchange Effluent Plant (SIXEP) 
and the Enhanced Actinide Removal Plant 
(EARP). 
 
In SIXEP, contaminated water from the spent 
Magnox fuel cooling ponds is filtered to 
remove particulates and then passed to ion-
exchange columns that remove most of the 
dissolved fission products, such as strontium-
90 and caesium-137. The effluent is then 
monitored and discharged to sea. The 
discharge of liquid effluents to sea, even 
after treatment to ensure that they comply 
with relevant regulatory authorisations, is 
the subject of continuing criticism both in the 
UK and internationally, in particular by the 
Irish and Norwegian Governments, and is 
one of the reasons put forward in support of 
calls to end reprocessing. 
 
There is also scientific comment on the 
selection of borosilicate glass as the solid 
high-level wasteform. In particular it has 
been proposed that ceramic wasteforms 
such as SYNROC (literally synthetic rock) 
would be more resistant to degradation 
under long-term geological disposal 
conditions. However, as noted above, a 
number of countries have carried out 
evaluations that show that glass is a suitable 
wasteform, and the UK regulatory bodies 
have specifically required the timely 
conversion of high active liquor to glass to 
achieve passive safety for the UK’s HLW. 
 
A key benefit claimed for the use of SYNROC 
as a wasteform is its resistance to leaching 
by groundwater. Since leach rates are not a 
significant issue in evaluations of the long-
term safety of geological disposal of long-
lived intermediate-level wastes, and given 
the difficulties of incorporating the diverse 
physical and chemical forms of such wastes 
into a ceramic matrix, SYNROC has not been 
selected as an appropriate wasteform. 
Cement-based encapsulating grouts are 
considered to offer the necessary safety 
functions and are capable of being tailored  
to match the different characteristics of 
different waste streams. 
 
3.6 Partitioning and 
transmutation 
Partitioning and Transmutation (P&T) is a 
suggested option for reducing the inventory 
of long-lived wastes. In summary, 
transmutation is the changing of one nuclide 
to another as a result of a nuclear reaction: 
most usually as a result of bombardment 
with neutrons from a nuclear reactor or, in 
more recent schemes, from a particle 
accelerator. In the context of radioactive 
waste management, the aim is to produce 
shorter-lived or stable nuclides. As a 
precursor to transmutation, it would be 
necessary to chemically separate some of 
the important radionuclides from other 
materials: this is known as partitioning. 
 
The MRWS document [15] referred to P&T 
and pointed out a number of potential 
difficulties: 
 
• P&T is only a partial solution as there are 
some long-lived nuclides that will still 
require an alternative waste 
management option; 
• It may be many years before industrial 
scale technology is available; 
• Adoption of P&T would imply an 
extension of reprocessing and the 
construction of transmutation target 
facilities, and reactors or particle 
accelerators (which would in turn require 
decommissioning and give rise to 
secondary wastes); 
• There could be increased worker doses. 
 
It was also noted that in some countries, P&T 
was seen as only applicable to a new phase 
of reactor build. It could also deal with 
redundant military plutonium. The report 
further point out that the UK has no plans to 
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 undertake its own research, but will continue 
to monitor research being carried out in 
Japan, US, France and the EU.  
 
P&T would be technically difficult and costly 
for the current UK inventory of low-level and 
intermediate-level wastes (LLW and ILW) 
due to the chemical diversity and the high 
levels of physical and isotopic dilution at 
which the target isotopes are present. The 
application of P&T to vitrified high-level 
waste (HLW) currently in stock is not 
considered to be technically feasible on an 
industrial scale. 
 
For uranium and plutonium, reprocessing 
technology has been developed and refined 
specifically to separate these materials from 
spent fuel. As transmutation of uranium and 
plutonium requires fission there are, in 
essence, two options: to use these materials 
as fuel within a new nuclear programme or 
to declare them as wastes.  
 
Potentially minor actinides could be 
partitioned from spent fuel, however this 
would require the construction of plant to do 
this. 
 
Although there has been considerable 
progress in P&T development over the past 
ten years, P&T remains a long-term venture. 
The introduction of P&T would require 
Government decisions, long lead times and 
large investments in dedicated fast neutron 
devices, extension of reprocessing facilities, 
and remotely operated facilities for fuel and 
target fabrication. 
 
3.7 Costs and funding 
3.7.1 Introduction 
At the outset of this section it should be 
noted that simple comparisons of cost 
between programmes particularly on an 
international basis are fraught with 
difficulties and can be misleading. Difficulties 
with cost comparisons arise from, for 
example, what is included or not included in 
the cost, the currency base and year, the 
volume and types of waste to be disposed of 
(e.g. inclusion of low and intermediate level 
wastes along with spent fuel and high level 
waste), the disposal design concept used, 
the waste generation scenario assumed, 
discount rates assumed, inclusion of 
contingencies, regulatory costs etc.  
 
As a generality, back–end waste 
management costs comprise the following 
components: 
 
• waste transport; 
• waste treatment and encapsulation; 
• decommissioning of nuclear plants; 
• interim storage; 
• deep repository costs: 
¾ research and development; 
¾ site selection, investigation and 
characterisation (possibly of more 
than one site); 
¾ design and construction; 
¾ operation; 
¾ decommissioning and closure; 
¾ contingency; 
¾ other costs (including 
organisational). 
 
3.7.2 Long-term waste management 
costs 
The CoRWM cost discussion paper [53] 
describes the different components of the 
long-term cost of waste management 
options and is referenced here. A revised 
version of this report with greater focus on 
uncertainties was due to be republished in 
December 2005. It is acknowledged in the 
report that there is little information on 
current waste management costs. The major 
cost items identified for the options it 
considered are:  
 
• Planning and licensing: these costs 
include application costs for facility 
construction, the cost of stakeholder 
consultation and public relations, the cost 
of a public inquiry, R&D costs for concept 
development and regulatory costs.  
• Design and construction: these costs 
include the cost of the design and 
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 construction of the waste management 
facility, and of any necessary supporting 
facilities.  
• Operation: these costs include the cost of 
waste characterisation, packaging and 
conditioning, operation of the waste 
management and supporting facilities, 
facility refurbishment, interim storage 
and transport costs.  
• Decommissioning and completion: these 
costs include the cost of 
decommissioning the facility, and of 
repository closure in the case of the deep 
disposal options.  
• Post-completion: these costs include the 
cost of monitoring and institutional 
control.  
• Additional costs: these costs include 
contingency costs, plus the cost of 
remediation, incentives and insurance, 
environmental costs and social costs.  
 
Table 5 summarises the findings of the 
unrevised report for the options mentioned 
earlier. 
 
A subjective evaluation of the risks 
associated with the development of each 
option has been made, using a scale of a 
high (H), medium (M), or low (L) likelihood 
of overspend as indicated. Quantifying these 
risks is highly subjective, but low risks might 
indicate a contingency of less than 25% and 
high risks might indicate a contingency of 
over 100%.  
 
Key uncertainties for the storage options are 
the construction cost of protected stores, the 
frequency and costs, of refurbishment, and 
the savings that might be incurred through 
development of one large facility versus 
several smaller facilities. It is difficult to 
account for the long-term costs of storage 
beyond say a 300-year period (through for 
example continuous replacement of stores 
into the long-term future), and compare 
these with the short-term costs of direct 
disposal.  
 
Key uncertainties for the deep disposal 
options are the scaling of costs in 
comparison with data for existing or planned 
facilities to allow for increases in inventory, 
and the savings in development, 
construction, and operational costs 
associated with co-location of repositories 
for ILW/LLW and HLW/spent fuel. The costs 
and frequency of refurbishment during care 
and maintenance are also a significant 
uncertainty. Nirex has developed cost 
estimates for the deep disposal options, 
including incremental costs and cost savings 
for a co-located facility (see below).  
 
A key uncertainty for the deep borehole 
disposal option  and the mounding option is 
the cost of developing the technology. 
Further, neither of these options deals with 
all of the wastes, and the costs of disposal of 
the remaining wastes would need to be 
assessed for comparison purposes.  
 
The costs of near-surface disposal of LLW and 
short-lived ILW are small in comparison to 
the costs of deep disposal of all wastes. The 
cost of including these wastes in a deep 
repository (£2,000/m3) may well be less 
than the costs for their near-surface disposal.  
The NDA has noted in its strategy document 
that if plutonium were to be reclassified as a 
waste, this would potentially add several 
billions to the overall radioactive waste 
legacy costs. 
 
The Nirex report N/122 [41] provides cost 
comparisons for its phased geological 
repository concept for ILW/LLW, a separate 
HLW/spent fuel repository and co-located 
facilities. Note there are certain physical and 
chemical considerations, and thus safety 
case implications, that have to be addressed 
in the design of co-located facilities; this 
would also mean having a sufficient 
available host-rock volume to accommodate 
both types of facility. 
 
See the following tables for further details: 
 
• Table 6: Stand-alone ILW / LLW 
repository programme and costs 
• Table 7: Stand-alone HLW / Spent fuel 
repository programme and cost 
estimates 
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 • Table 8: Co-location of ILW/LLW with 
HLW/spent fuel repository 
programme and cost estimates 
 
3.7.3 Decommissioning costs and 
funding 
The NDA strategy document presents 
estimated life-cycle costs for each of its sites 
and are summarised in the following table. 
These are based on Life Cycle Baseline 
reports produced for each site and are 
shown in Table 9. 
 
The total cost shown is £55,852m but 
against this should be offset an income of 
£11,380m from ongoing operations including 
electricity sales (£1,374m), waste disposal 
services at Drigg (£144m), reprocessing 
contracts at Sellafield (£7,481m) and fuel 
services at Springfields (£2,381m) plus a 
further £1,202m of other income. This 
provides a net cost total of £43,270m. 
 
The NDA also says that this figure could be 
offset by savings from new approaches and 
innovation to decommissioning and clean up 
through experience in the US nuclear clean 
up industry. The NDA also underline the 
importance of using competition as a key 
means of achieving better value for money 
for taxpayers. However, they also caution 
that the total could be considerably higher 
due to changes in the cost of dealing with 
the higher hazard legacy facilities especially 
at Sellafield and any reclassification of 
certain nuclear materials as waste. 
 
In arriving at the costs the NDA strategy 
document indicates that each of the sites 
has an end-state in mind (i.e. mainly “green 
field” or “brown field”) for planning and 
costing purposes. However, it adds that the 
green field assumptions do not take account 
of the flexible approach allowed in 
Government decommissioning policy (see 
section 2.3) which would not necessarily 
mean such an end-state. The NDA stress that 
the views of local stakeholders will be 
sought to reach a consensus on the way 
forward. 
 
Funding arrangements for the NDA are set 
out in the 2004 Energy Act. The NDA is 
funded by the Government through the 
Nuclear Decommissioning Fund as provided 
for under the Act. The funds are a 
combination of general Government 
spending and revenue from commercial 
activities on the NDA sites. Nirex, while 
separate from and independent of the NDA, 
obtains the majority of its funding through 
the NDA (the remainder being form the 
Ministry of Defence). 
 
Under the 2004 Energy Act, the NDA, on 
behalf of the DTI, oversees British Energy’s 
(BE) planning for decommissioning of its 
plants. This includes approving BE’s 
decommissioning strategies and approving 
payments to BE by the Nuclear Liabilities 
Fund (NLF, set up as part of its restructuring 
arrangements). Unless the NDA is otherwise 
directed, it assumes no direct responsibility 
for BE’s decommissioning work, but will 
ensure that BE undertakes these activities in 
a cost-effective manner that is consistent 
with the NDA draft strategy. Under BE’s 
restructuring plan it pays into the Nuclear 
Liabilities Fund (NLF) to cover its 
decommissioning costs; the fund is 
underwritten by Government. 
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 4 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
4.1 General 
There are some 39 countries with a civil 
nuclear power programme and some others 
with only research reactors or other 
significant sources of radioactive waste 
(excluding mill tailings etc.). It is often 
stated that there is international consensus 
on deep geological disposal as the preferred 
option for long-term radioactive waste 
management. A 2004 survey of those 
countries [54] indicated the Governments of 
18 countries (now 19) have taken a final 
decision on policy and have opted for deep 
geological disposal. A further 11 countries 
(now 10) had expressed a preference for 
deep geological disposal. 
 
Many countries have already implemented 
disposal for their short-lived wastes (often 
defined as those containing radionuclides 
with a half-life of less than ~30 years) and 
there are many examples of such 
repositories around the world. These wastes 
only need to be isolated from man's 
environment for about 300 years (ten half-
lives) until the radioactivity levels are such 
that the waste is radiologically safe. Some of 
these repositories can take limited amounts 
of long-lived low-level wastes subject to 
safety case considerations.  
 
It should be noted that there are no 
internationally agreed definitions of waste 
categories, effectively each country has its 
own classification system relating to its 
waste types. Below is given a brief overview 
of the repository programmes in a number 
of countries. 
 
4.2 Low and intermediate level 
waste disposal 
Near-surface repositories for such wastes 
exist in: France at Centre de la Manche, 
Centre de l’Aube and Morvilliers for VLLW; 
Japan at Rokkasho-Mura; Spain at El Cabril, 
the US for example at South Carolina, Utah, 
Washington State, Nevada; and many other  
countries. Note that Drigg in the UK only 
takes low-level waste. 
 
Other concepts include disposal in former 
mines (including Germany, Czech Republic). 
The one Swedish and two Finnish operating 
repositories for short-lived wastes are 
several tens of metres deep. 
 
In many Former Soviet Union countries and 
Russia itself, there are examples of 
operating near-surface repositories which 
were built to take the wastes from Soviet 
designed research reactors. Some have 
subsequently been extended to take 
institutional wastes, such as those from 
medical uses, research and industry; these 
are known as "RADON" type facilities.  
 
In Germany, the Morsleben repository for 
short-lived waste is at a depth of 524m in a 
former salt mine; it ceased operations in 
1998 and is now undergoing closure. The 
Swiss had a concept for horizontal access 
into the side of a mountain for this type of 
waste (but the site selection process failed) 
but such an idea is being implemented at 
Himdalen in Norway and Bátaapáti in 
Hungary.  
 
4.3 Long-lived waste disposal  
If long-lived wastes such as HLW, spent 
nuclear fuel, transuranic (TRU), long-lived 
intermediate level waste, and long-lived 
low-level wastes are to be disposed of they 
need to be buried at a depth of several 
hundred metres. The half-lives of some of 
the components of these wastes are many 
orders of magnitude greater than for short-
lived wastes. It is therefore important to 
isolate these wastes from man's 
environment for a very long time. Burying at 
depth will ensure that events such as 
glaciation do not expose the waste, there is  
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 a limited risk of accidental intrusion by a 
future society, and that the return time and  
dilution of contaminated groundwater is 
such that drinking water levels are 
unacceptably safe. 
 
Belgium considers two scenarios, one with 
full reprocessing of spent fuel and one with 
no further reprocessing with the direct 
disposal of the remaining spent fuel. In the 
first scenario some 5,000te of vitrified HLW 
would be disposed of at a depth of 250 
metres in a clay geology. It has not yet 
started a siting programme for the deep 
repository but has an underground research 
laboratory (URL) at Mol. 
 
The Canadian concept considers the direct 
disposal of some 70,000te of spent fuel at a 
nominal depth of 1,000m in a crystalline 
rock. It has just finished a consultation 
programme on the way forward for 
managing its nuclear fuel waste and so has 
yet to start a repository siting programme if 
disposal is the accepted way forward. In 
Canada, the Nuclear Waste Management 
Organisation has made a recommendation to 
Government in November 2005 for an 
“adaptive phased management approach” 
for the management of spent nuclear fuel. 
This is not too dissimilar to the Nirex Phased 
Geological Repository Concept. 
 
In Finland, Posiva Oy, the waste 
management organisation, has now selected 
a site for a deep repository for spent fuel at 
a site in Eurajoki, nearby to the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power station. Should investigations 
be successful it anticipates applying for a 
construction permit around 2012 with 
operations beginning in 2020 in line with 
Government requests. The Finns plan to 
dispose of their ~3,000te of spent fuel at a 
depth of about 500m in crystalline rock. 
Their programme is perhaps the most 
mature - with construction of an 
underground research facility (ONKALO) 
taking place. As at December 2005, the drift 
access had been constructed to a depth of 
approximately 100m (of an estimated total 
depth around 500m) and a length of nearly 
1 kilometre.  
A limited amount of long-lived waste was 
disposed of in the Asse salt mine in Germany 
as part of its research programme. Also in  
Germany, the Konrad repository for non-heat 
generating wastes has received a licence to 
operate but this has not been implemented 
to date because of court action. However, 
this is hoped to be resolved in 2006. 
Spain has yet to decide on implementing a 
disposal programme.  
 
Sweden’s concept is based on the disposal of 
nearly 10,000te of spent fuel at a depth of 
500m in crystalline rock. The waste 
management organisation SKB is 
investigating sites nearby to Forsmark and 
Oskarshamn nuclear power stations; it 
intends to select a single site by 2008 and 
have construction of a repository completed 
and ready for first waste emplacement by 
2015. They too have a URL at Äspö, near 
Oskarshamn which also hosts a nuclear 
power station, the spent fuel encapsulation 
laboratory and the CLAB interim spent fuel 
store. 
 
The Swiss concept considers the disposal of a 
mixture of spent fuel and vitrified HLW – 
equivalent to about 3000te of spent fuel at a 
depth of about 650m in a clay geology. Site 
investigations are taking place in the north 
of the country and the Swiss are also 
considering the co-location of low level 
waste in the facility, following the earlier 
failure of a separate siting programme. They 
too have URL at Mont Terri in the north and 
at Grimsel in the south. 
 
In the US, the Department of Energy has 
selected the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada. 
The concept here considers the disposal of 
some 110,000te of spent fuel and 
~13,000 te of vitrified HLW at a depth of 
450m in the volcanic tuff. It is the only “dry” 
repository concept in the world. The US has a 
separate repository near Carlsbad, New 
Mexico, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 
(WIPP). It is currently the only operating 
deep geological repository for long-lived 
waste in the world. This facility takes 
defence related transuranic wastes (similar 
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 to long-lived ILW) and has been in operation 
since March 1999. 
 
4.4 International 
decommissioning experience  
The Nuclear Energy Agency of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
development (NEA/OECD) is just one of 
several international organisations with an 
interest in decommissioning nuclear plants.  
It regularly holds workshops and seminars 
and has published several documents on the 
subject. In September 2004 the NEA 
published a brochure [55] which gave 
examples of decommissioning projects 
around the world, including (in addition to 
some UK examples mentioned earlier): 
 
• Uranium conversion plant in Korea which 
is ongoing until 2007; 
• Fuel fabrication plants at Hanau in 
Germany; 
• Power reactor decommissioning: 
¾ Japanese 10 MW(e) demonstration 
reactor (1996); 
¾ 100 MW(e) heavy water reactor, 
Niederaichbach, Germany (1995); 
¾ 300 MW(e) Fort St Vrain gas-
cooled reactor, USA (1992); 
¾ 900 MW(e) Maine Yankee PWR, 
USA (2005);  
¾ 670 MW(e) PWR, Würgassen, 
Germany; 
¾ Trojan 1180 MW(e) PWR, USA; 
¾ Connecticut Yankee 582 MW(e) 
PWR 
• Eurochemic reprocessing plant Belgium 
which is ongoing until 2008. 
 
The NEA also held a workshop in September 
2004 [56]  from which the main messages to 
emerge were, in summary:  
 
• Decommissioning is a mature industrial 
process and many projects have been 
safely completed with support of local 
communities. Technical and scientific 
issues are well understood and practical 
experience and associated lessons are 
being documented to guide future 
activities.  
• Individual countries need to further 
develop integrated decommissioning and 
waste management strategies to ensure 
that long-term solutions will be available 
for all wastes generated from 
decommissioning.  
• Realistic and streamlined regulatory 
programmes are being developed with 
feedback from industry experience and 
are placing more responsibility and 
accountability on licensees. 
• Accurate decommissioning waste cost 
calculation methods is needed. Further 
work and experience exchange on cost 
comparisons between different 
strategies (for example clearance and 
recycling/reuse of materials versus direct 
surface disposal) would be valuable. 
• International clearance criteria have 
been established, with individual 
countries free to adopt them. 
• Financial mechanisms for 
decommissioning funding are evolving in 
the NEA member states to meet 
regulatory and project needs. Continuing 
challenges are uncertainties in cost 
estimates and the implementation of 
measures to assure that funds will be 
available when required. 
• Creative research on decommissioning is 
being carried out. Human factors and 
organisational issues are studied. 
Practical solutions are being 
implemented such as the use of 
management transition programmes. 
Some increased efficiency and 
effectiveness is needed by way of R&D 
on improving technology and developing 
innovative techniques, subject to 
justification of its cost and value.  
• Continuing emphasis on education in 
critical nuclear skills is needed to ensure 
availability of the necessary expertise for 
both near-term decommissioning needs 
and long-term energy needs. 
• Public acceptance is still a major 
challenge. Without public acceptance, 
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 decommissioning may be prolonged and 
difficult to implement.  
 
4.5 Financing radioactive waste 
management in other 
countries 
This section of the report describes the 
funding arrangements for radioactive waste 
management and decommissioning in a 
number of European countries, and the US. 
The prime source of the information has 
been derived from the national waste 
management organisations’ published 
material and from other studies, such as and 
EU study published in 1999 [57]. As a 
generality, financing schemes follow the 
“polluter pays” principle.  
 
In mid 2002, the European Commission, 
through DG Energy and Transport (DGTREN) 
attempted to introduce a “nuclear package” 
of proposed Directives and regulations 
aimed at harmonising measures for nuclear 
safety and radioactive waste management 
in an enlarged EU. Part of the package was a 
proposed Directive on Funding Nuclear 
Liabilities at the end of Facility Life. The idea 
was that all nuclear facilities should have 
segregated finds to cover the costs of 
decommissioning, so that this aspect of 
electricity pricing was transparent. The move 
was motivated by the opening up of the 
energy markets in order to avoid obstacles 
to fair competition. This part of the package 
has since been removed, however, it is clear 
that there remains an interest in the 
Commission and European Parliament to see 
financing measures in place.  
 
4.5.1 Belgium 
Belgium operates a “reservation of capacity” 
financing scheme which protects against 
financial uncertainties in the reference 
disposal programme. There are two sources 
of funding. For ongoing waste production, 
the waste producers pay fees to the national 
waste management organisation 
(ONDRAF/NIRAS) to cover waste treatment 
(if appropriate), interim storage. In addition, 
fees are paid into the “Long-Term Fund”, 
administered by ONDRAF/NIRAS, to cover all 
final disposal liabilities. Historic liabilities 
(pre-1989), nuclear plant decommissioning 
and site restoration are funded by special 
agreements between the Belgian State and 
the electricity sector. 
 
4.5.2 France 
The national waste management 
organisation of France, ANDRA , runs L/ILW 
and VLLW disposal facilities for which a 
charge per package is levied. ANDRA’s deep 
site programme is pre-financed under 
contracts based on customers volume 
forecasts for the deep repository. EdF’s 
decommissioning, waste disposal (to 
ANDRA) and reprocessing activities are 
funded through provisions for liabilities out 
of electricity income. COGEMA includes a 
decommissioning fee in its customer 
reprocessing contracts.  
 
4.5.3 Finland 
The two nuclear operators, Fortum and TVO, 
pay separately into the segregated Nuclear 
Waste Management Fund. The contribution is 
about 10% of the cost of nuclear electricity 
and is determined by the Government which 
manages the fund through a Board of 
Governors. The fund’s assets must match the 
liabilities which includes conditioning 
storage, and disposal of spent fuel and 
decommissioning waste. Fortum and TVO 
have the right to borrow up to 75% of their  
own contribution backed by guarantees. The 
State may borrow other 25%. If the rights 
are not exercised, the fund lends on the 
open market. (See also section 4.7.3.) 
 
4.5.4 Germany 
Waste producers must bear all costs for 
radioactive waste management and disposal 
as prescribed by law. Nuclear utilities build 
up (tax-exempt) reserves to pay for future 
management and disposal. The pre-
operational financing for Konrad and 
Gorleben repositories (non-operational at 
this time) were paid for by the nuclear 
utilities, nuclear research centre and small 
producers. For the operational repository at 
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 Morseleben, which was commissioned by 
the former GDR Government and has now 
closed, waste producers paid a volume 
based fee for disposal; however, closure 
operations are being financed by the Federal 
Government. 
 
4.5.5 Netherlands 
The national waste management 
organisation COVRA charges fees to waste 
producers for all direct costs for transport, 
conditioning and storage and eventually 
disposal (even though a decision on that has 
been deferred for 100 years). The future 
disposal fees are placed in a capital growth 
fund. 
 
4.5.6 Spain 
(Note, this is subject to imminent change.) 
Low and intermediate-level waste disposal 
fees at El Cabril are dependent on waste 
type and volume. For spent fuel 
management and disposal, and 
decommissioning the financing is based on a 
levy on electricity prices. This is paid into a 
segregated fund (managed by ENRESA) and 
applied across the whole electricity sector. 
The fee is determined by a complex method 
based inter alia on nuclear power station 
output. The fund also finances historical (pre-
fund) liabilities. 
 
4.5.7 Sweden 
In Sweden a fee system has been set up 
based on nuclear plant output which covers 
cost of spent fuel management and 
decommissioning. The fee is calculated 
based on the operational life of the reactors 
(40 years is assumed) by national waste 
management organisation SKB and 
submitted to SKI (the Swedish Nuclear 
Power Inspectorate) which in turn seeks 
approval from the government for the fees 
to be applied. 
 
4.5.8 Switzerland 
Nuclear utilities cover present waste 
management costs as they arise and future 
costs by means of reserves which are levied 
annually. The amount is calculated such that 
sufficient funds will be gathered during the 
lifetime of the plant to cover 
decommissioning, management and disposal 
of waste. Provision was made under the law 
for the setting up of a decommissioning fund 
which has its own legal identity and is 
managed under the supervision of a 
Commission appointed by the Federal 
Council. The NPP owners pay into the fund 
an amount determined by the Commission. 
 
4.5.9 USA 
Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) 
nuclear utilities pay 0.1cent per kWh of 
nuclear electricity into the Nuclear Waste 
Fund. The fund pays for a component of the 
waste management research programme at 
Yucca Mountain, the other component 
coming from Defense Department funding. 
The fund is not a segregated fund and US 
Department of Energy has to ask Senate / 
Congress each year for its budget 
appropriation. Funding of historic enrichment 
plants liabilities comes from a separate 
Federal fund. Decommissioning of NPPs is 
the responsibility of the owners.  
 
The Atomic Energy Act requires the owner to 
decommission at the end of life, and take 
financial responsibility for this (apart from 
high-level waste). Four types of funds are 
acceptable to the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission: external fund that builds up 
over facility lifetime; prepayment account 
kept separate from other assets and outside 
its control; surety bond, letter of credit or 
insurance which guarantees payment if the 
utility defaults; and corporate self-
guarantees based on certain financial 
criteria. 
 
4.5.10 Other Countries 
In Bulgaria, the nuclear plant operators pay 
3% of the electricity selling price into a 
waste management fund and 8% into a 
separate decommissioning fund, both 
created in 1999. In the Czech Republic, the 
operators pay a levy based on installed 
capacity into nuclear account. 
Decommissioning costs are covered by 
financial reserves. Hungary has a Central 
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 Nuclear Financial Fund operated by the 
Atomic Energy Authority into which the 
nuclear operators pay a levy of about 4% of 
the consumer price.  
 
In Lithuania an electricity levy for Ignalina 
NPP is paid into its decommissioning fund; 
currently the activities of its waste 
management organisation are paid for 
through the State budget. Slovakia has a 
State Fund for decommissioning, spent fuel 
and radioactive waste management into 
which Slovak Electric pays 10% of the selling 
price of nuclear electricity. In Slovenia there 
is an independent fund for waste 
management and decommissioning 
established which includes local nuclear 
community representatives; the situation 
here is complicated by the fact that its single 
nuclear power station is jointly owned with 
Croatia and there is ongoing bilateral 
discussion regarding financing issues. 
 
4.6 Case Study –Vandellós I NPP 
decommissioning 
4.6.1 Technical details 
Vandellós-1 was a 500MW(e) gas-cooled, 
graphite-moderated reactor (see Figure 4: 
Decommissioning of Vandellós I nuclear 
power plant, Spain (Courtesy ENRESA)), 
which used metallic natural uranium fuel, 
clad in a Magnox alloy within a graphite 
sleeve. It is located about 75 miles south-
west of Barcelona on the coast. The site also 
contains Vandellós 2 PWR and a new gas 
plant is under construction. 
 
Unlike the UK Magnox stations, it was a 
single unit plant. The pre-stressed concrete 
reactor pressure vessel contained the nuclear 
steam supply system, the core and steam 
generators. The unit was constructed 
between 1967 and 1972, and operated from 
1972 to 1989, when a serious fire in the 
turbine hall brought its operation to a close. 
Whilst there were no radiological 
consequences of the fire and only damage to 
conventional plant, the expense of 
upgrading to new regulatory requirements 
led to the decision of permanent shutdown.  
Vandellós I is the first nuclear plant to be 
decommissioned in Spain. Information for 
this part of the report is taken from a recent 
article in Nuclear Engineering International 
[58], the decommissioning report for the 
plant [59], from direct contact with ENRESA 
personnel and from visits to the plant.  
 
Stage I decommissioning (as defined by the 
IAEA) comprising initial defuelling and 
graphite waste conditioning operations were 
the responsibility of the plant owner, 
Hifrensa. The Magnox fuel elements were 
shipped to France for reprocessing with 
conditioned graphite sleeves remaining on 
site. In addition, certain conventional 
disassembly operations were carried out, 
such as the CO2 tanks and the main turbine-
alternator sets. This stage was completed in 
February 1998. 
 
Stage II decommissioning is the 
responsibility of ENRESA, the Spanish public 
company responsible for radioactive waste 
management and decommissioning, which 
took over operations at the site at the end of 
Stage I. This stage of decommissioning 
initially consisted of dismantling and 
demolishing most of the buildings on the 
site external to the reactor box, sealing the 
reactor pressure vessel and reducing the 
height of the reactor building by some 30m 
(see Figure 4). The only radiologically 
controlled zone is the reactor basement 
which houses the conditioned graphite 
interim-store.  
 
LLW and short-lived ILW was disposed of at 
Spain’s El Cabril near surface repository and 
large amounts of material have been 
recycled off-site or for non-active material 
used as on-site infill. The radioactive 
components that remain on site are mainly 
the graphite core and activated components 
within the primary containment, and 
containerised crushed graphite. 
 
A major feature of this phase was the 
segregation of active and non-active waste 
materials to determine whether they could 
be recycled, conventionally scrapped, 
decontaminated or needed to be treated as 
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 radioactive waste. ENRESA set up a 
sophisticated control system that ensured no 
material leaving the site for conventional 
destinations exceeded the regulatory levels 
of activity.  
Between 1998 and 2003 some 15,900te of 
mainly metallic material was generated and 
recycled; minor amounts of conventional 
hazardous waste was sent to authorised 
disposal tips. Of this about 8,000te 
originated in the active zones and was 
declassified and cleared.1,961te of rubble 
from the active zones of the plant were 
cleared for land restoration along with 
77,000te of concrete from the demolition of 
buildings. 
 
1,763te of low and intermediate level 
radioactive waste was generated and 
disposed of at El Cabril through 188 transport 
operations. As noted above, conditioned 
graphite and some other fuel sleeving 
components remain stored on site.  
 
The initial phase of Stage II was completed 
in June 2003 and the reactor safe enclosure 
is now in a latency period (c.f. care and 
maintenance) of 25-30 years before Stage III 
decommissioning commences to take down 
the reactor building and restore the site. This 
latency period will allow the radioactivity in 
the internal structures to decay naturally to 
about 5% of current levels.  
 
The concrete safe enclosure contains only 
the reactor pressure vessel with 5m thick 
walls and top and bottom slabs 6-7m thick. 
The activity content of the vessel is about 
4,000TBq of mainly Co-60 and the residual 
heat is between 4-5kW. The vessel has 1700 
penetrations which were cut, seal welded, 
inspected and the covers insulated with 
polyurethane foam to avoid condensation. 
The leak-tightness of the vessel is regularly 
checked with satisfactory results. To the end 
of 2003, Stage II has cost €94M, (€4M over 
budget) and took 63 months compared to 
the 60 months originally planned. 
  
4.6.2 Stakeholder engagement 
In planning and undertaking the 
decommissioning, ENRESA has to address the 
expectations and concerns of a number of 
stakeholders, including the regulators, local 
authorities, the existing workforce, media 
and the general public.  
 
As well as developing a detailed engineering 
project plan and waste management 
strategy, ENRESA has established policies for 
training and motivating former plant 
employees, employment, safety and 
transparent communication. 
 
ENRESA has promoted links with local 
political parties and public institutions. For 
example, local press briefings and seminars 
are organised to discuss different aspects of 
the decommissioning. Relations with the 
public include organising visits and provision 
of information to allow them to gain an 
insight to the activities. The site hosts a 
visitors centre and the site tours cover the 
whole site including the reactor basement 
(including viewing windows looking directly 
into the waste store), the pile cap and roof. 
There are between 2000 and 5000 visitors 
each year. By the end of 2003 over 24,000 
people had visited the site, almost 80% 
being from educational institutions. The 
other 20% being official national and 
international organisations, media, industry 
and other institutions. 
 
Promotion of local employment was also 
seen as a key feature of the 
decommissioning work. Some 63 different 
companies have worked on the project with 
a peak of 30 companies and 420 workers on 
site at once, with 65% of the workers 
involved coming from the local municipality. 
1500 training courses have been run and 
there have been no serious accidents. 
 
4.7 Case study: Finland 
4.7.1 Introduction 
The Finnish case study considers the waste 
management strategy being implemented 
and the relationship with the decision to 
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 build a new nuclear reactor at Olkiluoto. 
Finland is often cited as an example of 
where positive steps have been taken in 
both implementing a waste management 
policy, and on taking a decision for new 
nuclear power stations. 
 
Under the 1987 Nuclear Energy Act, the first 
step towards a new nuclear facility, final 
repository or power station, is the so-called 
Decision in Principle (DiP). At this step the 
Government has to consider whether “the 
construction project is in line with the overall 
good of society”. In particular, the 
Government pays attention to the need for 
the facility, the suitability of the proposed 
site and its environmental impact. 
 
Under the requirements, the Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) has to make 
a preliminary safety appraisal of the DiP 
application and the proposed host 
municipality must state its acceptance or 
rejection for siting the facility. The decision 
has then to be endorsed by the Parliament. 
The application for the DiP also includes 
submission of an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) report for the planned 
facility. 
 
4.7.2 Overview nuclear power in 
Finland  
Finland has four nuclear reactors providing 
27% of its electricity; two Soviet designed 
VVERs at Loviisa owned by Fortum, and two 
Swedish BWRs at Olkiluoto owned by TVO. A 
parliamentary vote in May 2002 supported 
the building of a fifth reactor, a 1600MW(e) 
EPR design, a decision made through the DiP 
process. The plant is now under construction 
for 2009 start-up. This was the first decision 
for a new nuclear power station in western 
Europe in over a decade. The site of the new 
unit was agreed in October 2003 and is at 
TVO's Olkiluoto site. 
 
The country's 1997 energy policy stressed 
availability, security, diversity, price, and the 
need to meet international environmental 
commitments. For electricity, Finland is part 
of the deregulated Nordic system, which 
faces shortages, especially in any dry years, 
which curtail hydroelectric generation. With 
growing demand and the need to ensure 
reliable economic supply over the long term, 
various studies were carried out which 
showed that nuclear power was the 
cheapest option for Finland.  
 
TVO is a public-private partnership company, 
43% Government-owned, 57% private, with 
the owners taking their shares of electricity 
at cost, any unwanted portion being sold 
into the Nordic market. This means that 
output is effectively contracted to each 
owner over the life of the plant. The private 
owners are mostly heavy industry with a 
high demand for base-load power, and 
hence low costs are critical for them.  
 
The 1987 Nuclear Energy Act allowed both 
final disposal within Finland and the export 
of Loviisa spent fuel to the Soviet Union. 
Finland affirmed its long-term management 
option as deep geological disposal within the 
country in 1994, when an amendment to the 
Act meant that all spent fuel should be 
managed within the country. As a result, in 
1996 the export of spent fuel from Loviisa to 
the Mayak reprocessing complex in Russia, 
under a complete fuel cycle service 
arrangement connected with the supply of 
the reactors, ceased. 
 
At Olkiluoto, surface pool storage for spent 
fuel has been in operation since 1987. The 
facility has 1270te capacity and is designed 
to hold spent fuel for about 50 years, 
pending disposal. At Loviisa, expanded 
interim storage pools was required by the 
expiry of the Russian arrangement, were 
commissioned in 2000. 
 
4.7.3 Waste management funding and 
costs  
Responsibility, including costs, for nuclear 
wastes remains with the power companies 
until its final disposal. The State Nuclear 
Waste Management Fund is an external fund 
controlled by the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry (MTI), and was established under 
the 1987 Act. The fund is required to cover 
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 all the costs of all nuclear waste 
management including operational waste 
disposal at each site, decommissioning 
waste disposal and spent fuel disposal. 
Contributions to the fund are collected 
through the price of nuclear electricity.  
 
As of mid 2005, ~€1.4Bn had been 
accumulated in the fund . The charges are 
set annually by the Government. Overall 
costs of radioactive waste management, 
including decommissioning, are estimated at 
about 10% of total power production cost.  
 
4.7.4 Waste management 
implementation  
Finland does not reprocess its spent fuel, and 
so does not generate significant quantities of 
long-lived ILW. Spent nuclear fuel is 
considered a waste and is planned for 
disposal. The main waste streams which 
require management are spent nuclear fuel, 
LLW, and short-lived ILW. An underground 
repository at Olkiluoto for low and 
intermediate-level operational wastes has 
been in operation since 1992. Construction of 
this cavern took three years and cost ~£10M. 
A similar facility at Loviisa has been 
operational since 1998. Both will be 
expanded to take eventual decommissioning 
wastes from each station. 
 
Process 
Finland's nuclear waste management 
program was initiated in 1983 soon after the 
four reactors started commercial operation, 
when the Government set guidelines and a 
schedule for long-term nuclear waste 
management. The policy included legislation 
to ensure public participation, and a local 
right of veto on the siting process. Work on 
siting has proceeded over twenty years. In 
1983 TVO drew up a list of 101 sites which  
was published and undertook a consultation 
process with the affected communities. This  
resulted in the identification in 1985 by TVO 
of 5 potential volunteer sites at which more 
detailed investigations were carried out 
between 1986 and 1992. In 1992, TVO 
announced that further investigations would 
only be carried out at three sites, including 
Eurajoki (near to the Olkiluoto nuclear site). 
However, at the request of the local 
community in Loviisa, it was added to the 
list. 
 
Posiva Oy was set up in 1995 as the 
organisation responsible for implementing 
spent fuel disposal and it took over the siting 
programme from TVO. It is jointly owned by 
the nuclear plant owners. In May 1999, 
Posiva submitted an Environmental Impact 
Assessment report to MTI and a DiP 
application for Eurajoki to the Government, 
although the EIA report itself had to consider 
the alternative three candidate sites.  
 
After hearings in November 1999, the 
Ministry gave its statement, which 
completed the EIA process. During the 
hearing period 15 authorities and public 
bodies, 5 civic organisations and 
communities and 23 municipalities 
submitted their statements on the EIA report 
to the MTI. In addition, some 15 private 
persons sent their opinions.  
 
The opinions expressed by the authorities 
and municipalities were mainly positive and 
the EIA report was regarded as wide and 
thorough, although one concern was the 
potential deterioration of the image of the 
municipality. The anticipated health impact 
by spent fuel transport was also of concern. 
The opinions of private individuals and civic 
organisations on the EIA, as well as on the 
whole disposal project, were in general 
critical and opposing. Their viewpoints were, 
however, mainly focused on issues outside 
the scope of the EIA.  
 
The MTI concluded in its statement that the 
EIA was sufficiently comprehensive and 
detailed and fulfilled the requirements set 
by the EIA legislation. The Ministry indicated 
that the construction licence application for 
the facility (scheduled to be submitted after 
10 years at the earliest) should include an 
updated EIA report. 
 
STUK engaged an international review team, 
to support its preliminary safety appraisal of 
the DiP application. The team summarised 
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 their findings in a consensus report to STUK 
in October 1999. In addition, STUK requested 
statements from several Finnish research 
institutes which have participated in the 
publicly funded waste management research 
programme. STUK submitted a preliminary 
safety appraisal of Eurajoki to MTI in January 
2000. In this appraisal STUK concluded that 
the prerequisites for a DiP from the 
standpoint of nuclear and radiation safety 
were met. 
  
In January 2000, the Eurajoki council gave its 
approval to the DiP application (20 votes for, 
7 against) and ratification by Parliament by a 
159 to 3 vote was given in May 2001.  
 
Prog ess 
Posiva has adopted SKB’s spent fuel disposal 
concept. An underground rock 
characterisation facility - ONKALO – began 
construction at the site in the summer of 
2004 and will be completed by 2010. It will 
have characterisation levels at 420m and 
520m. This will eventually be excavated at 
the 420m level to construct the repository, 
subject to satisfactory investigations and 
regulatory approval.  
 
A construction licence for the repository and 
the associated fuel encapsulation plant will 
be sought about 2012, with a view to 
operation from 2018. Encapsulation will 
involve putting twelve fuel assemblies into a 
boron steel canister and enclosing this in a 
copper capsule – i.e. the SKB concept. Each 
capsule will be placed in its own hole in the 
repository and backfilled with bentonite clay. 
Access to the tunnels will be maintained and 
the spent fuel will be recoverable.  
The cost estimate for disposing of 2600tU of 
spent fuel from the four existing reactors 
during 40 years of operation is about 
~£550M, including construction costs of 
~£150M, encapsulation and operating costs 
~£360M. With the fifth reactor, some 6500te 
of spent fuel will require disposal. By the 
end of 2004, 1380tU had been accumulated 
at both nuclear power station sites.  
 
Operational and decommissioning waste
As noted, ongoing arisings of LLW and short-
lived ILW are disposed of at each of the sites 
and decommissioning waste will also be 
accommodated there.  
 
Although reactor decommissioning is the 
responsibility of the two power companies 
separately, they do undertake joint research. 
Plans are updated every five years. Further, 
Posiva reviews the plans for both 
decommissioning and operational wastes, 
and publishes annual reports on its findings. 
 
4.7.5 Discussion  
There are several points to note in reflecting 
on the Finnish experience, with regards to 
the decision on new reactor build, and 
associated waste management.  
 
These include: 
 
Long term planning: the establishment of a 
clear long-term policy of waste 
management, and also the time necessary 
to implement it, should be noted. The waste 
management programme was established in 
1983, and a policy decision on deep 
geological disposal was affirmed in 1994. A 
decision on a final site was taken in 2001, 
and the facility is expected to be in 
operation in 2020.  
 
Public Involvement:  
¾ The involvement of the local 
communities has been enshrined 
in the decision-making process, 
including provision of a veto at key 
decision points. This has led to 
robust decision-making. 
Legislation: 
¾ The waste management 
programme and public approval of 
final disposal have been supported 
by appropriate legislation, which 
has been adapted to the values of 
society and prevailing attitudes.  
Waste management strategy: 
¾ The wastes requiring management 
in Finland are not as complex as in 
the UK, arising mainly from nuclear 
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 power generation. It has been 
possible to identify clear and 
appropriate waste management 
strategies, based on sound science 
that have also secured public 
acceptance.  
New build: 
¾ Following an open debate, 
including involvement of the 
waste management organisation, 
Finland has commissioned a fifth 
nuclear reactor and is considering 
a further one. The process for the 
fifth reactor was similar in law to 
the decision process for the 
repository and permission for its 
construction given in the 
knowledge that a disposal route 
was available for spent fuel and 
other waste arisings.  
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 5 NEW BUILD 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The government announced in its 2003 
Energy White Paper, that the nuclear energy 
option is to be kept open and stated that: ‘at 
some point in the future new nuclear build 
might be necessary if we are to meet our 
carbon targets’  [60]. The White Paper also 
pointed out that “… there are also important 
issues of nuclear waste to be resolved. These 
issues include our legacy waste and 
continued waste arising from other sources.”  
 
Before building any new nuclear power 
stations there would have to be the “fullest 
public consultation” which the Prime 
Minister has said will commence in 2006, 
with the aim of making a decision on nuclear 
power during this parliament [61]. It is 
assumed such a consultation will need to 
address the waste implications of a new 
nuclear build programme, as foreshadowed 
in the White Paper. 
 
With regards to waste management, any 
wastes arising from a new build programme 
would need to follow regulatory guidance 
with regards to conditioning, packaging, and 
ensuring that wastes were assessed for 
future disposability. Ideally, waste 
management and decommissioning issues 
should be addressed at the beginning of any 
new build discussions. The involvement of 
the waste management organisation 
charged with implementing any policy on 
long-term waste management in decisions 
regarding the technical design of new 
reactors would bring benefits. For example, 
if the new reactor design were to give rise 
to new or novel materials which might have 
an impact on for example, decommissioning 
practice or repository safety, early 
discussions could identify any appropriate 
design impacts early on and these be 
minimised. 
 
The current nuclear programme is expected 
to come to an end by 2035 with the 
scheduled closure of the Sizewell B PWR. It 
has not yet been decided which reactor type 
would be adopted as part of any new build 
programme; however, certain types of 
reactors have been suggested as potentially 
viable for the UK e.g. the Westinghouse 
AP1000 PWR, the Advanced CANDU reactor, 
the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) and 
the European Pressurised Water Reactor 
(EPR).  
 
All these technologies are expected to be 
ready for implementation within the next 20 
years. The UK has also been involved in a 
collaborative international research and 
development project on promising new 
nuclear energy systems that would meet 
future energy challenges [62], this is known 
as the Generation IV Forum. Six reactor types 
have been recommended by this forum for 
further research on the basis of the ability to 
meet certain goals which could potentially 
be implemented within the next 50 years. 
 
5.2 The MRWS programme and 
new-build 
The MRWS document was relatively silent on 
the potential outcome of the process and its 
effect on a decision for new build. It stressed 
that even if no new nuclear plants were built 
there is still the legacy of wastes to be dealt 
with, but it did acknowledge that in addition 
to the economics, the future role of nuclear 
will depend on securing public confidence in 
relation to issues such as safety and the 
environment, indicating for example that 
waste management would need to be 
addressed. 
 
CoRWM has not explicitly sought views on 
new build in its consultations. However, 
many respondents have raised the issue. The 
relationship of CoRWM’s recommendations 
and new build is important to many, with 
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 some arguing that a decision is needed to 
enable new build, and some arguing that 
the difficulty of long-term radioactive waste 
management means it would be 
irresponsible to create further wastes. 
Further discussion on these aspects can be 
found through the CoRWM website. It 
remains to be seen how the MRWS process 
may deal with the new build issues.  
 
5.3 Inventory implications 
5.3.1 Volume implications 
With regard to future nuclear power 
generation, the House of Lords Science and 
Technology Select Committee report [] 
concluded that the volumes of long-lived 
waste from the construction of a “small 
number” of new reactors would have little 
effect on waste volumes and, in this sense, 
the Committee did not strongly link this to 
the choice of long-term waste management 
option.  
 
In CoRWM’s inventory study [], the waste 
volume implications for a 10GW(e) installed 
capacity for different reactor types were 
presented. These assumed no reprocessing 
and that spent fuel would be packaged in 
standard 1.1m diameter canisters used in 
SKB’s KBS-3 Swedish disposal concept. See 
Table 10: Waste volume arisings for 10GW(e) 
installed capacity. 
 
The Nirex Reference Repository Concept for 
UK high-level waste and spent fuel is based 
on the KBS-3V concept, including canister 
design. Canister dimensions have been 
modified (but not optimised) to 
accommodate UK HLW/SF (i.e. varying 
lengths and 0.9m diameter). The Nirex 
estimates packaged volumes for both the 
baseline (AGR and PWR) are therefore lower 
than those estimated by CoRWM – see Table 
11. 
 
5.3.2 Activity implications 
Waste volume is not the only criteria which 
may impact on the design or capacity of a 
waste management or disposal facility. 
Radionuclide inventories, and chemical and 
physical characteristics could all have an 
impact on how an option is implemented. 
 
CoRWM estimate that, for the scenario of life 
extensions to existing AGR and PWR stations 
and a programme of 10 new reactors, the 
amount of radioactivity could be up to a 
factor of 5 greater than the baseline [46]. 
However, estimating the percentage 
increase in radioactivity from 10 AP1000 
reactors is complex as the increase is 
dependent on a number of assumptions. For 
example higher burn up for fuels in new 
reactors would lead to higher specific 
activities. Moreover the reference time 
chosen for the comparison is dependant on 
the presence of short-lived radionuclides, 
which dominate when fuel is taken out of 
the reactor.  
 
Table 12 has been prepared by Nirex and 
shows the percentage increase in 
radioactivity for radioactive wastes and 
spent fuel from 10 new AP1000s for decay 
times of 10, 50 and 100 years after removal 
from the reactor. These represent the years 
2090, 2130 and 2180 if it is assumed that 
the new build operation is between 2040 
and 2080. Note that LLW has been excluded 
from the table as this represents only a 
small fraction of the total activity.  
 
Thus, the increase in total activity could be 
as high as a factor of nine, 10 years after 
final fuel removal which decreases to a 
factor of 0.9 of current total activity 100 
years after final fuel removal. 
 
5.4 Spent fuel and operational 
waste management 
implications  
It is assumed that the radiological as well as 
physical and chemical characteristics of the 
LLW, ILW and spent fuel from AP1000 or EPR 
reactors would not differ significantly from 
those produced by the existing PWR at 
Sizewell. As the AP1000 reactor is based on 
a passive design, fewer components are 
required which means less waste during the 
operation and the decommissioning of the 
plant. Also the absence of an active 
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 emergency core cooling system and other 
simplifications are also expected to have a 
significant impact on the size of the auxiliary 
buildings. This could also lead to a reduction 
in the amount of waste produced during the 
decommissioning of the plant. The AP1000, 
EPR and ABWR would not pose any 
significant new waste packaging challenges 
(assuming regulatory stability).  
 
The PBMR contains much graphite as both 
moderator and fuel and thus will make up a 
large proportion of the waste. This graphite 
will be contaminated despite the favourable 
fission product retention capabilities of the 
fuel and will create a disposal challenge 
mainly due to its volume, porosity, 
leachability, carbon-14 content and 
flammability. Most of this graphite (non-
fuel) could potentially be purified and reused 
for nuclear purposes. The fuel design allows 
for direct disposal in casks without any 
further fuel processing and the graphite (in 
the form of carbon spheres) is a stable long-
term disposal waste form and could be 
packaged using existing technologies. It is 
thought that special overpack materials will 
not be needed and this may consequently 
have an effect on the volume of the waste.  
 
As can be seen from Table 10, the 
unpackaged volume of PBMR spent fuel is 
significantly larger than the packaged 
volume of spent fuel from the other designs; 
moreover, the packaged volume is expected 
to be even greater than this. However, the 
fuel has a relatively low decay heat because 
of the presence of graphite which may mean 
that the packages can be emplaced together 
more closely in a repository than other types 
of spent fuel.  
 
In the case of Advanced CANDU’s, these use 
enriched uranium dioxide fuel as do the 
current AGRs and PWR, but the CANDU fuel is 
enriched to a lesser degree. Additionally, 
zircalloy is used as the fuel cladding, as used 
for Sizewell B’s fuel. Therefore, a future 
CANDU system would not introduce new 
waste types. In the case of the ACR-700, 
which is more compact than Sizewell B, less 
decommissioning wastes would result.  
However, if novel materials were proposed 
their impact on geological repository safety 
would have to be evaluated early in the 
decision-making process when reactors 
designs were being developed and 
considered. The rigorous assessment 
processes developed by countries for 
assessing suitability of radioactive wastes 
would need to be followed once it was 
known what reactors were being considered, 
what materials used etc. 
 
5.5 Repository design 
implications 
The Nirex phased geological repository 
concept for ILW and some LLW was discussed 
in section 3.3.2 which also noted that a 
concept for HLW/spent fuel has been 
developed. The impact on the reference 
HLW/spent fuel concept is presented in 
Table 13. 
 
The impact from 10 new AP 1000s on 
repository footprint has been assessed based 
on waste being emplaced 50 years after the 
spent fuel has been removed from the 
reactor. The increase on a stand alone 
HLW/SF repository footprint would be 
slightly less than the 87% increase in the 
number of canisters; the increase on a stand 
alone ILW repository footprint would be 
slightly less than the 2.5% increase in the 
volume noted in Table 11; the impact on the 
footprint of a co-located ILW and HLW/SF 
repository would be to increase the 
repository footprint by about 50% above 
that for current ILW/LLW and HLW/SF 
volumes. 
 
5.6 Implications of burning 
plutonium in new reactors 
Should new nuclear power reactors be built 
in the UK, their use could be considered to 
manage the plutonium stockpile through the 
burning of mixed oxide fuel (MOX) or inert 
matrix fuel (IMF). MOX comprises PuO2
 
(5%) 
and depleted uranium oxide. IMF (exclusion 
of U-238) comprising Pu in an inert matrix, 
hence no fresh uranium or Pu would be 
produced in the reactor. It should be noted 
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 that in burning Pu as MOX, the uranium in 
the fuel will produce more Pu, and hence 
the Pu would not be destroyed completely. 
British Energy advised CoRWM [46] that 
separated plutonium could in principle be 
used in the manufacture MOX for Sizewell B 
and AGRs, although the commercial case has 
made it unattractive. New nuclear power 
reactors, depending on design, could also 
use MOX fuel, but at today’s uranium prices, 
burning MOX fuel in light water reactors may 
be uneconomic. Thus existing stocks of 
separated plutonium would only be used if 
uranium prices rose, MOX fuel were used as 
a plutonium management tool, or the fast 
reactor programme was resumed. It is noted 
that the overall quantity of plutonium would 
remain roughly constant (depending on 
burn-up rates, number of reactors etc.), as 
separated plutonium would become part of 
the irradiated spent fuel rather than remain 
as plutonium oxide.  
 
If a new programme of reactor build were to 
be undertaken, up to 95% of the UK’s 
plutonium stockpile could be used as MOX 
fuel, the other 5% remaining as stockpile, 
and requiring further chemical treatment. 
Assuming this was in place of “fresh”, un-
recycled uranium fuel, this strategy would 
have only a marginal impact on additional 
wastes generated, and could address some 
of the security issues surrounding the 
plutonium stockpile.  
 
Both the AP600 and AP1000, the latest 
Westinghouse designs of the PWR, have 
been considered as potential new builds to 
manage the plutonium stockpile. Studies 
have indicated that the AP1000 can run on a 
full core loading of MOX fuel and could 
convert 95% of the current plutonium 
stockpile into spent fuel. (See for example 
the CoRWM position paper on plutonium [63] 
and the February 2005 note by the 
Parliamentary Office of Science and 
Technology [64]). The EPR has been designed 
to take up to 50% MOX fuel loadings.  
CoRWM inventory studies [46] said that there 
could be a potential reduction of up to 
3,270m3 of Plutonium and up to 6,840m3 of 
uranium if that was used in MOX fuel. 
 
Spent MOX or IMF fuel has a higher heat 
output than spent UO2 fuel. Whilst deep 
geological disposal of spent MOX fuel is 
feasible, it would have implications for a 
repository design, and would need to be 
taken into account at the design stage. This 
would also be true for interim storage.  
 
5.7 Decommissioning 
implications 
The AP1000 design has a nuclear steam 
supply system power rating of 3415MW(t), 
with an electrical output of at least 
1000MW(e). The design life is 60 years 
without a planned replacement of the 
reactor vessel. However, the design provides 
for replaceability of other major 
components, e.g. the steam generator. 
 
The AP1000 comprises two heat transfer 
circuits, each containing a steam generator, 
2 reactor coolant pumps, one hot leg, and 
two cold legs. This can be compared with a 
standard 4-loop PWR comprising 4 steam 
generators, 4 hot legs, and 4 cold legs. 
Hence for an AP1000, there is a reduction in 
components of two steam generators plus 
associated pipe-work. There are a number of 
design factors which the manufacturer 
argues will lead to significantly simpler, 
quicker and cheaper decommissioning for 
the AP1000.  
 
These are:  
 
• Reduced number of components through 
advanced design. The AP1000 design has 
between 35% (e.g. pumps) and 80% 
(e.g. heating, ventilation and cooling 
units) fewer pieces of equipment than 
for example the Sizewell B design; and 
• Modular construction simplifies 
decommissioning.  
 
The EPR is rated at 4500MW(t), with an 
electrical output of 1600MW(e), and is based 
on an evolutionary PWR design with a 
number of enhanced design features. The 
design life is 60 years. The EPR comprises a 
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 four-loop system each containing a steam 
generator, a hot leg and a cold leg. In an 
early study of wastes from future LWRs, it 
was concluded that differences in the 
designs of eight PWRs and one BWR, 
including EPR, had no major implications for 
the UK waste management policy [65]. 
 
5.8 Reprocessing and recycling 
A number of the reactor types considered in 
the Generation IV Forum specifically require 
the reprocessing of spent fuel to recycle 
nuclear materials into a new fuel. More 
generally, a significant increase in the use of 
nuclear power across the world might make 
recycling a necessity for security of supply 
and economic reasons. 
 
Evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle 
represents a key component of the overall 
evaluation of possible future reactor types. 
One possibility that is being considered is to 
sue “dry reprocessing” technologies that do 
not involve dissolving the spent fuel in large 
volumes of aqueous and/or organic 
solutions, with the associated issues of 
managing liquid effluents. As noted in 
Section 3.6, the development of new 
reprocessing methods in association with 
new build would allow consideration of the 
integration of partitioning and transmutation 
technologies as a means of managing the 
long-lived radionuclides produced in the fuel 
cycle.  
 
5.9 Waste management cost and 
funding implications 
5.9.1 Waste management costs 
An NEA study [66] concluded that except for 
gas-cooled reactors, the type of reactor does 
not seem to significantly affect 
decommissioning costs on a unit cost per 
kW(e) installed capacity basis. For all water 
reactors for which data were available, the 
cost per kW(e) installed capacity appeared 
reasonably independent of reactor type, and 
the capacity effect, although noticeable, was 
not significant. The average cost of PWR 
decommissioning plus one standard 
deviation was $515 per kW(e), or about 
£291 per kW(e). On the basis of a 1600 
MW(e) unit, the decommissioning costs 
would therefore be about £466M.  
 
The BNFL decommissioning cost estimate [67] 
for the AP1000 is £0.6/MWh electricity 
output. On the basis of one 1200 MW(e) unit 
operating for 50 years, the decommissioning 
cost estimate would be about £525M. An 
Oxera study [68] for decommissioning costs 
estimated £210/kW(e) assuming a 3.5% 
discount rate, and this corresponds to a cost 
of £252M for a 1200 MW(e) unit. It is to be 
expected that cost estimates will vary 
significantly owing to the uncertainties and 
methods used in the calculations. Taking 
these aspects into account, the two 
estimates are in reasonable agreement.  
 
It has been claimed that whilst the waste 
management policy issue needs resolution, 
the financial impact of waste management 
and decommissioning is minimal [69].  
 
In terms of impact on repository costs, 
section 3.7.2, indicated that a standalone 
ILW/LLW repository has a lifecycle cost of 
about £6.3bn, that for a standalone HLW/SF 
repository of £4.9bn and for a co-located 
facility a cost of £8.2bn. The impact on costs 
of 10 new AP1000 new build programme 
assumes that the variances are additional to 
an ILW repository and a separate HLW/SF 
repository as identified in [70]. 
 
The volume of additional ILW is small as a 
result the variable costs for small volume 
variations can use the marginal cost of 
£4k/m3 of conditioned waste. The additional 
cost for ILW is therefore c. £30 million 
(£4k/m3 x 8,000m3). This value does not 
include any estimate for uncertainty but it is 
considered that it will not significantly 
increase the overall risk estimate assumed 
for an ILW repository of £1.2 billion.  
 
The cost impact of HLW is zero as it is 
assumed that no reprocessing will take place 
and all spent fuel from 10 new AP1000 
stations will be disposed of directly. 
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 Using the variable cost estimation for 
HLW/SF of £278k per canister, the additional 
cost of 10 AP1000s would be £2 billion 
(£278k x 6673 extra canisters). This value 
does not include any estimate for 
uncertainty but is considered to be of the 
same order as that for an ILW repository. 
The long term liabilities associated with 
waste management and decommissioning 
have in the past been a significant hurdle for 
private investors. If any future programme 
were to involve private finance, it might be 
considered possible that there may be some 
level of Government involvement to give 
confidence that these risks would be on a 
basis for which the private sector could 
make appropriate arrangements, whilst 
taking into account any relevant European 
legislation on competition or state aid (see 
section 4.1).  
 
5.9.2 Financing 
As noted in section 2.3, Government policy 
states that any new nuclear facility should 
be designed and built so as to minimise 
decommissioning and associated waste 
management operation and costs. This 
approach will ensure that the UK minimises 
the creation of decommissioning liabilities 
for future generations.  
 
Any operator of any new power station 
would need to have fully developed and 
funded plans for the waste management 
and decommissioning activity both in order 
to obtain an operating license and funding. It 
is clear that the costs and liabilities of waste 
management and decommissioning of new 
reactors would need to be fully taken into 
account on any programme of new build.  
 
If there were a decision to proceed with a 
programme of new reactor build there are a 
number of scenarios for how that 
programme might be delivered and funded. 
The issues surrounding each are outside the 
scope of this report. However, a new build 
programme could be implemented through 
the public sector, private sector or a 
combination of both. 
 
It is possible that future decommissioning 
and waste management costs could be 
covered by nuclear operating companies 
being asked to pay a proportion of operating 
income each year into a fund to ensure 
money was available.  
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 6 TABLES AND FIGURES 
  
 
 
Box 1: Description of radioactive wastes  
High Level Wastes (HLW) Wastes in which the temperature may rise significantly as a result of 
their radioactivity, so this factor has to be taken into account in the design of storage or disposal 
facilities. Initially HLW comprises nitric acid solutions containing the waste products of 
reprocessing spent nuclear fuels. 
 
Intermediate Level Wastes (ILW) Wastes exceeding the upper boundaries for LLW, but which do 
not require heat to be taken into account in the design of storage or disposal facilities. The major 
components of ILW are metal items such as nuclear fuel casing and nuclear reactor components, 
graphite from reactor cores, and sludges from the treatment of radioactive liquid effluents. 
 
Low Level Wastes (LLW) Wastes other than those suitable for disposal with ordinary refuse, but 
not exceed 4GBq/te alpha or 12GBq/te beta/gamma activity. Overall, the major components of 
LLW are soil, building rubble and steel items such as ducting, piping and reinforcement from the 
dismantling and demolition of nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities and the clean up of 
nuclear sites. However, at the present time most LLW is from the operation of nuclear facilities, 
and this is mainly paper, plastics and scrap metal items. A sub-category of LLW is Very Low Level 
Waste (VLLW, <0.1m3 with low activity - <400kBq), which arises mainly in small volumes from 
hospitals and universities. It is disposed of to landfill, either directly or after incineration, under an 
appropriate regulatory regime. VLLW is not included in the National Inventory. 
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  Figure 1: CoRWM’s shortlist of options (7 images)  
1. Interim storage above ground at central locations 
 
2. Interim storage below ground at central locations 
 
4. Deep geological disposal at a 
central location 
 
3. Interim storage above ground at or close to existing 
nuclear sites 
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5. Phased geological disposal at a central location 
 
6. Deep boreholes at a central location 
 
7. Non-geological disposal at or close to existing nuclear sites 
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 Figure 2: Overview of decision-making process using SEA and EIA 
 
EIA to identify
a preferred 
Planning 
application for 
waste 
SEA to identify a 
short-list of 
potential sites 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The phased geological repository concept 
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 Figure 4: Decommissioning of Vandellós I nuclear power plant, Spain (Courtesy ENRESA) 
1. General view during operation 
 
2. Dismantling operations  
 
3. Reactor underside  
 
4. Waste sorting 
 
5. Safe enclosure 
 
6. View of Vandellós I and II 
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 Table 1: Managing Radioactive Waste Safely – illustrative timetable (amended) 
Stage 1 
The consultation on process, consideration 
of responses, planning the next stage. 
2001-02 
Stage 2 
Research and public debate to examine 
the different options and recommend the 
best option (or combination).  
Government decision on option(s) to 
implement. 
2002-06 
Stage 3 
Consultation on how the preferred 
option(s) should be implemented. 
2007 
Stage 4 
Implementation including legislation, if 
needed. 
2008 onwards 
 
 
Table 2: Stages in the SEA process mapped onto the radioactive waste management process 
Stage in SEA process 
Action relating to radioactive waste 
management 
Organisation 
responsible 
Stage A: Setting the context 
and objectives, establishing 
the baseline and deciding 
on the scope 
National consultation on the site selection 
process including the siting criteria, the roles 
and responsibilities of organisations, local 
community power in the decision-making 
process and community benefits. 
Government or 
Overseeing 
body 
Stage B: Developing and 
refining alternatives and 
assessing effects 
The siting criteria and process are applied by 
the implementer to the UK to assess sites and 
identify a potential short-list of sites to be 
evaluated in an EIA. 
Implementer 
Stage C: Preparing the 
Environmental Report 
A report (Sustainability Appraisal) of the 
assessments is written, including a summary 
report. 
Implementer 
Stage D: Consulting on the 
draft plan or programme 
and the Environmental 
Report 
A national debate to review the Sustainability 
Appraisal. 
Government 
Stage E: Monitoring the 
significant effects of 
implementing the plan or 
programme on the 
environment 
Processes will need to be put in place to 
monitor the implementation of the 
programme and ensure and adverse 
environmental impacts are mitigated. 
Government 
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Table 3: Stages in the EIA process mapped onto the radioactive waste management process 
Stage in EIA process Action relating to radioactive waste 
management 
Organisation 
responsible 
Scoping Consultation on the scope of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment, 
what should be assessed and how 
and how stakeholders should be 
involved. 
Implementer 
Assessment The short-list of sites are assessed 
against the agreed criteria to 
identify a preferred site. 
Implementer 
Writing environmental report A report (Sustainability Appraisal) 
of the assessments is written, 
including a summary report. 
Implementer 
Environmental impact assessment 
report review 
A national debate to review the 
Sustainability Appraisal. 
Government 
Decision Government will decide whether to 
approve implementation of the 
facility at the recommended site 
Government 
Implementation and monitoring The implementer will construct the 
facility and the Government will 
ensure appropriate monitoring is 
undertaken. 
Government 
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 Table 4: Baseline volume changes for different scenarios 
Volume change for waste type (m3) Scenario 
Spent fuel HLW ILW Plutonium Uranium 
Volume 8,150 1,290 353,000 3,270 74,950 
Baseline Activity 
(TBq) 
33 x 106 39 x 106 2.4 x 106 4 x 106 3,000 
Reprocess remaining 
3,500tU AGR SF 
-5,410 +250 +7,000 
+580 
(18te) 
+1,660 
(3,390tU) 
Reprocess 1,200tU 
Sizewell B PWR SF 
-2,740 +90 +2,000 
+450 
(14te) 
+550 
(1,120tU) 
No substitution for 
overseas wastes with 
return of ILW 
 +60 -5,000   
Decay storage / 
decontamination 
(waste producer 
plans) 
  -19,000   
Segregation of ILW 
and LLW in cases 
where they are mixed 
and disposal of LLW 
  -4,500   
Extend AGR lifetimes 
by 5 years (1,320tU 
fuel not reprocessed) 
+840  +4,100   
Extend Sizewell B PWR 
lifetime by 10 years 
(300tU fuel not 
reprocessed) 
+680  +170   
Early closure of 
Magnox reprocessing 
/ Magnox reactors 
 -160 –8,800 
–640 
(20te) 
– 3,390 
(6,940tU) 
Early 
decommissioning of 
nuclear power 
reactors 
  +17,580   
Early closure of THORP  -250  
-580 
(18te) 
-1,660 
(3,390tU) 
Unaccounted SSRSs   +<10   
10 x AP1000 reactors 
31,900 
(14,000tHM) 
 +9,000   
Use of UK separated 
Pu/U in new build 
MOX 
   
-3,270 
(105te) 
–6,840 
(14,000tU) 
 
 
 
Waste and decommissioning www.sd-commission.org.uk 
 
50 
  
Table 5: Summary costs for CoRWM short-listed waste management options53 
Option Cost 
1 Long term interim storage and its variants:  
  Local, above ground, protected  £14.5bn (L) 
  Local, above ground, unprotected   £7.5bn (L) 
  Local, below ground, protected  £12.5bn (M) 
  Centralised, above ground, protected £12bn (L) 
  Centralised, above ground, unprotected £6.5bn (L) 
  Centralised, below ground, protected £7.5bn (M) 
2 Deep geological disposal:  
  Deep disposal £9.5bn (M) 
  Disposal in boreholes (HLW,SF, Pu) £5.5bn (H) 
3 Phased deep geological disposal £13bn (M) 
4 Non geological disposal (near surface) for reactor decommissioning 
wastes only: 
 
  Engineered vault, local to current wastes, protected £0.2bn (L) 
  Engineered vault, centralised, protected £0.125bn (L) 
  Mounded over reactors £3bn (H) 
  Below ground disposal £0.2bn (M) 
 
 
 
Table 6: Stand-alone ILW / LLW repository programme and costs 
Cost component Costs (£m) End date 
Sunk costs 700  
MRWS 50 2007 
Site characterisation 910 2020 
Construction and underground research 1940 2040 
Operations of facility (includes further 
construction) 
1830 2090 
Care and maintenance 510 2140 
Closure 250 2150 
Total £6.2 billion  
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 Table 7: Stand-alone HLW / Spent fuel repository programme and cost estimates 
Cost Component Cost (£m) End date 
Site characterisation 920 2007-2020 
Construction and underground research 1600 2040 
Operations of facility (includes further 
construction) 
2100 2090 
Closure 315 2100 
Total £4.9 billion  
 
 
Table 8: Co-location of ILW/LLW with HLW/spent fuel repository 
programme and cost estimates 
Cost Component Cost 
(£m) 
End date 
Sunk costs 700  
MRWS 50 2007 
Site characterisation 1050 2020 
Construction and underground research 2470 2040 
Operations of facility (includes further 
construction) 
3040 2090 
Care and maintenance 530 2140 
Closure 330 2150 
Total £8.2 billion  
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 Table 9: NDA Decommissioning, clean up and operating cost estimates by site 
£m Sites 
Decommissioning 
& clean-up costs 
Operating 
costs 
Total cost 
Berkeley 823  823 
Bradwell 1,129  1,129 
Chapelcross 1,663  1,663 
Dungeness 1,035 128 1163 
Hinkley 1,130  1,130 
Hunterston 1,214  1,214 
Oldbury 1,155 213 1368 
Sizewell 1,099 139 1238 
Trawsfynydd 1,116  1,116 
Magnox 
Wylfa 1,221 489 1710 
Culham 196  196 
Dounreay 2,908  2,908 
Harwell 918  918 
Windscale 662 8 670 
UKAEA 
Winfrith 461  461 
Drigg 1,340  1,340 
Calder Hall 1,284  1,284 
Sellafield 23,650 7,895 31,545 
British Nuclear 
Group 
Capenhurst 1,145  1,145 
Westinghouse Springfields 461 2,370 2,831 
Total  44,610  55,852 
 
 
Table 10: Waste volume arisings for 10GW(e) installed capacityiv
Packaged volume (m3) Reactor type x number 
10GW(e) eq. 
Spent fuel 
(tHM) Fuel in SKB 
canisters 
ILW LLW 
AP1000 x 10 14,000 31,900 9,000 80,000 
EPR x 7 9,200 21,000 13,000 100,000 
ABWR x 8 15,400 31,500 187,000 
PBMR x 98 modules 6,200 130,000v 10,800v 
 
                                                
iv Neither the figures for legacy nor new build wastes include depleted uranium that has been or would be 
generated in the fabrication of fuel. 
v Assumes 460m3 of HLW would be returned overseas. 
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 Table 11: Waste volume increases for 10 x AP1000 reactorsiv 
Packaged volume (m3) Scenario 
Spent fuel HLW ILW LLW 
Baseline 
8,150 (CoRWM) 
6,700 (Nirex) 
1,290v 353,000 
2.48 million + 37,200 
(non-Drigg) 
m3
31,900 (CoRWM) 
20,000 (Nirex) 
- 9,000 80,000 
AP1000 x 10 
% 
increase 
390% (CoRWM) 
300% (Nirex) 
0% 2.5% 3% 
 
 
 
Table 12: Activity increases for a new build of 10 x AP1000s 
Activity (TBq) Scenario Year 
Spent fuel HLW ILW Total 
Baselinevi 2090 6.0x106 1.4x107 1.1x106 2.0x107
2090, 10 post 
removal 
1.8x108 
3000% 
- 
8.7x104
8% 
1.8x108
900% 
2130, 50 post 
removal 
6.0x107
1000% 
- - 
6.0x107
300% 
AP1000 x 10vii
2180, 100 post 
removal 
1.8x107
300% 
- - 
1.8x107
90% 
 
 
 
Table 13: Impact of new build on number of canisters to be handled 
Number of canisters Scenario 
AGR spent fuel PWR spent fuel HLW Total 
Legacy 3,398 572 3,700 7,670 
AP1000 x 10 - 6,673 - 6,673 
Total    14,343 
% increase    87% 
 
                                                
vi ILW inventories based on 2001 Inventory [37] (ILW from AP1000 estimated as a ratio of ILW from PWR 
Sizewell B). HLW/SF inventories based on reference [40]. 
vii Based on the 2001 inventory data in Reference [46]. This has also been compared against the recent 2004 
Inventory information and found to be very similar. 
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